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DEVELOPMENT  OF  EUROPEAN  INTEGRATION 
I.  GENERAL  PROBLEMS 
1.  The problem of Italian representation in the European Parliament 
The problem of Italian representation in the European Parliament arose with 
the renewal of the Italian Parliament in April 1963.  So far,  however, the new 
Chamber of Deputies and the new Senate have not appointed their Strasbourg 
representatives for the fourth legislative period (1963-1968) because of the 
contrasting attitudes among the Centre-Left majority - between Socialists and 
Republicans on the one hand and Christian Democrats and Social Democrats on 
the other  - to the question of admitting Communists to the Italian delegation. 
The problem of Italian representation has therefore become the problem of 
Communists in the European Parliament. 
As already indicated, the problem arose with the formation of the Centre-Left 
Government.  In fact the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) had requested the pres-
ence of the Communists when it was negotiating the formation of the first 
Moro government (November 1963) but had had to accept the decision of the 
president of the Council appointed to deal with the problem that it should be 
treated as falling within the province of the Parliament rather than of the 
Government. 
The PSI's request was based on the attitude taken up by the Socialists up to 1952 to 
the appointment of  the Italian delegation to the Common Assembly of the ECSC. 
Even then they had been advocating the presence in the delegation of all par-
liamentary groups,  and therefore of their own and the Communist party, both 
of which were at the time opposed to European integration.  However, the pro-
gress this made, first in the ECSC  and then in the EEC and Euratom, induced 
the Socialists and Communists to review their positions.  This in turn led the 
Socialists  to call for a European Parliament elected by universal suffrage. 
This was the argument put forward by Paolo Vittorelli (PSI),  responsible for 
the party's foreign section,  at the Eleventh Assembly of the friends of  'il 
Mondo' (Rome,  2-3 February 1963)  (1)  which found its most complete expres-
(1)  See 'Che fare per l'Europa ?'  Milano,  Edizioni di  Comunit~, 1963, 
pp.  134-35. 
- 1-sion in the majority motion adopted by the Thirty-fifth Congress of the Party 
(Rome,  25-29 October 1963).  The motion read: '(the Party) calls for decisive 
action by Italy to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Treaty of Rome 
for  the  election of a European Parliament by direct universal suffrage (1). 
It was against this background that the Socialists made their request for 
Italian representatives to be elected  - with no exceptions  - to the European 
Parliament by the Cha, 'lbers,  as a first step towards direct popular elections. 
As already noted,  howt•ver,  this request was not accepted.  The Government 
programme stated instead that the European Parliament should be elected by 
universal suffrage.  The problem of Communist representation came back to 
the fore,  however,  immediately after the second Moro government was forrred 
in August 1964, through the agency of Mr.  Saragat (Social Democrat), then 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequently President of the Republic.  In an 
interview granted to a weekly journal (2)  Mr. Saragat stated: 'Personally, I 
think that if the Italian Communist Party accepts ,in an official declaration, the 
rules of the game of the Common Market, that is,  accepts its institutions, al-
though in the hope of working \vithin them with a view to changing them,  then 
any form of discrimination against that party should be stopped.' 
Mr.  Saragat returned to his statement and enlarged on it on 5 November 1964 
in the course of a television interview.  Asked whether it was not politically 
inadvisable to have Communists in the European Parliament, he replied: 'But 
the Government's programme asserts that we want a Parliament elected by 
universal suffrage.  How could a future European Parliament  elected in this 
way exclude representatives of the Communist Party? Pending the advent of a 
European Parliament elected by universal suffrage I would ask: is it possible 
to deny the Communist Party adequate representation in the assemblies of the 
European Parliament ?'Mr. Saragat went on to say: 'But the Communist 
Party is present in the Italian Parliament and absent in a European Parlia-
ment.  This is something I cannot understand. If ours is a democratic way of 
life and if we recognize the right of each citizen to belong to any party,  we 
must accept the Communist Party's right to fair representation in interna-
tional assemblies just as we accept it in the Italian Parliament' (3). 
In these replies Mr.  Saragat had posed the problem and indicated its solution. 
For their part the Communists displayed their readiness to follow the Com-
munity rules of the game.  Even Togliatti in the Yalta memorandum of August 
1964 (4) had maintained that the democratic workers' movement could not 
stand aside from what was happening in the Common Market, that is, fromthe 
(1)  'Avanti ', 30 October 1963. 
(2)  'L'Espresso', 24 September 1964. 
(3)  'L'Unit~', 6 November 1964. 
(4)  See 'Rinascita', No.  35,  5 September 1964, pp.  1-4'. 
- 2 -trend towards international concentration. Along these class J i.nes the Commu-
nist Party was approaching Community problems and upholdi:lg its role in the 
process of European integration. 
On 12 February 1965 , in the course of a budget debate in the  Sen.~.te, Mr.  Pe  senti, 
Communist Senator,  asked the Govern.ment on behalf of his party to give a 
clear-cut undertaking to abolish any form of discrimination in the future Italian 
delegation to the European Parliament (1). 
On 21st February the Central Committee of the PCI approved an agenda em-
bodying its request to be admitted to Community ·bodies,  and therefore to the 
European Parliament (2).  Mr.  Longo,  Secretary General of the PCI,  stated in 
an interview given to a fortnightly review (3)  that denying Com.munists admit-
tance to Community bodies was 'a flagrant breach of the  constitution and of 
the principles and usages that governed the appointment of representatives in 
our Parliament'. On 29 May,  during a  debate in the Senate on delegating to 
the Government the issuing of provisions on matters provided for in the EEC 
and EAEC Treaties, Mr.  Perna, Communist Senator,  stated that it was essen-
tial to renew Italian representation without delay,  and that 'every vote,  every 
decision taken on this subject should clearly and unmistakably reflect the 
Italian Parliament as it is,  and with the forces it embodies' without excluding 
'those that now represent more than 30 per cent of the population, if we con-
sider those who follow our party and,  as a whole,  those who follow the entire 
opposition of the Left' (4). 
The Socialists persisted with their argument that all sectors of the Italian Par-
liament should,without exception, be represented in the European Parliament, 
This argument was repeated in the report submitted by Mr.  de Martino, Secre-
tary of the PSI, to the party's Central Committee on 7 to 9 April..  In his intro-
ductory speech Mr.  de Martino stated that the Socialists looked forward to 
such an arrangement not because they pursued the political aim of admitting 
the Communists to European organizations  - an aim that was foreign and of 
no interest to them  - but because democracy forbade discrimination and be-
cause exclusion of the Communists clashed with the declared will to introduce 
direct universal suffrage for elections to the European Parliament (5).  This 
argument was again put forward by Senators Banfi and Vittorelli (Socialist) in 
the Senate debate on delegating to the Government the issuing of provisions on 
(1)  Senato della Repubblica,  Resoconto stenografico,  12  February 1965, 
p.  12769, 
(2)  'L'UniHt 
1
,  22  February 1965. 
(3) 
1Astrolabio
1
,  15  April 1965, 
(4)  Senato della  Repubblica,  Resoconto stenografico,  29 May 1965, 
p.  16145. 
(5)  'Avanti 
1
,  8 April 1965, 
- 3-matters provided for by the EEC and EAEC Treaties.  A request was made by 
Senator Banfi on 2 8 Ma~ and by Senator Vittorelli on 29 May that the question 
of renewing the Italhm delegation should as soon as possible be put on the 
agenda of the two sect)ons of the Parliament (1). 
The Social Democrat Party (PSDI)  reviewed its position on the question of 
Communist representation in Strasbourg following Mr.  Saragat's election as 
President of the Republic  In an article in the party's official organ (2), 
Mr. Orlandi wrote : 'Ab f_'ommunity bodies are,  at least in the present phase, 
a reflection of the nation::i,  governments,  the election of parliamentary repre-
sentatives in Strasbourg i::;  a government problem rather than one of balanced 
representation.  The parliamentary groups among which the majorityis devided 
are fully entitled to demand complete representation, if only because it is 
impossible to arrive at an arrangement binding on all political sectors of the 
Parliament.' This,  indeed,  lay at the root of the change in the Social Democrat 
Government.  Moreover, had such a criterion been adopted it would have de-
nied representation to all opposition movements, namely, the Italian Social 
Movement and the Liberal Party on the Right,  and the PCI and the Socialist 
Party for proletarian unity on the Left. 
The opposition of the Christian Democrats to the presence of Communists in 
the European Parliament has always been dictated by tl;le  PCI' s  opposition to 
the Rome Treaties and its intention of drawing a contrast between the path 
taken by the EEC and political union among the Six.  The Christian Democrats 
defended their argument,  which implied maintaining the existing system of 
choice, that is, the majority system  in the event of negotiations or re  shuf-
flings of governments, while abiding by the principle of direct elections to the 
European Parliament by universal suffrage.  The reply to Senator Tolloy 
(Socialist) appearing in an article in a weekly journal (3)  and attributed to 
Mr.  Scelba,  clearly takes up that position.  The article points out that Italian 
parliamentary representatives have always been elected under the majority 
system,  and that Christian Democrats could not accept a change in that sys-
tem which would have opened the door to the Communists,  since this would 
have been to surrender to the Communist Party's demands.  Aceording to 
Mr.Scelba the Parliament was in fact 'adequately represented by the presence 
of the many parties making up the Government majority and by that of the con-
stitutional opposition.' Mr.  Scelba went on to say that,  given the European 
Parliament's role as a consultative body of the governments, the presence of 
Communists was not necessary.  He added that,  as the problem was a political 
one,  tit is not the duty of a democratic electoral body to elect representatives 
(1)  Serrato della Repubblica,  Resoconto stenografico,  28 May 1965, 
p.  16025; 29 May 1965,  p.  16142. 
(2)  'Socialismo democratico',  11 April 1965. 
(3)  'Il Centro',  11 April 1965. 
- 4-of a party that is anti-democratic'.  The case would be different in the event of 
elections  by universal suffrage, when citizens would be free to elect whoever 
they wanted.  'But not today, because this would be to presem the Communists 
with another weapon for their subversive activities.' 
In spite of Foreign Minister Fanfani's.proposal to the Senate on 29 May that 
the Parliament should proceed to 'bring up the Italian delegation to  the Euro-
pean Parliament to the maximum level, both as to number  and as to the de-
gree of representation' (1),  the problem cropped up yet again.  It was loudly 
raised by Mr.  Bertoldi (Socialist) who on 15 October, during the debate in the 
Chamber of Deputies on the ratification of the treaty for the merger of the 
Executives,  invited the Assembly to renew the delegation in Strasbourg so as 
to accommodate  the Communists (2).  This invitation was welcomed on 
19 October by Mr.  Alicata for the Communists and by Mr.  Montanti for the 
Republicans.  Mr.  Alicata maintained that the reluctance to renew the dele-
gation in this way - an overhaul now more than two years overdue - concealed 
the desire to perpetuate,  against every sound democratic principle, discrimi-
nation against the forces of the Left (3).  Mr.  Montanti stated that the Repu-
blicans requested the election of deputies to the European Parliament,  and 
maintained that no group ought to be excluded from such elections,  which 
were 'intended to carry over into the European Community a true reflection 
of the national parliaments as they actually were in each of the six member 
States' (4).  The President of the Chamber,  Mr.  Bucciarelli Ducci (Christian 
Democrat),  took the opportunity of advising the Assembly that he had drawn 
the attention of group chairmen some time ago to the problem of renewing the 
delegation,  and would have put the matter on the agenda as soon as possible 
even if  the groups had not agreed on its composition  (5).  These statements 
were welcomed on behalf of the Government by the Under-Secretary  of State 
for Foreign Affairs,  Mr.  Lupis (Social Democrat), who also protested at 
what Mr.  Fanfani had said on a number of occasions on the same subject (6). 
The request made by Mr.  Bertoldi on behalf of the Socialist Party created 
quite a stir throughout the country and gave the exponents of all parties an 
opportunity to express their points of view.  Speaking on 20 October for the 
PSI,  the chairman of the parliamentary group of the Chamber,  Mr.  Ferri, 
(1)  Senato della Repubblica,  Resoconto stenografico,  2 9 May 196  5, 
p.  16119. 
(2)  Camera dei Deputati,  Atti parlamentari,  15 October 1965, p.  18128. 
(3)  Camera dei Deputati,  Atti parlamentari,  1,9  October 1965, p.  18191. 
(4)  Camera dei Deputati,  Atti parlamentari,  19 October 1965,  p.  18212. 
(5)  Cam  era dei Deputati, Atti parlamentari,  19 October 1965, p.  18208. 
(6)  Camera dei Deputati,  Atti parlamentari,  19 October 1965, 
pp.  18224-25. 
- 5  -made a statement to the press to the effect that the Italian delegation should 
re.flect all the political movements represented in the Italian Parliament. 
Members of the Government majority should form the bulk of the delegation 
but representatives of the opposition parties should not be excluded (1). 
Mr.  Santi,  Left-wing Socialist, was quoted in a newspaper (2)  as saying that 
an end should be put to nndemocratic discrimination, particularly as in the 
event of the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage it 
would be absurd to shut out any party, whether Communist or anti  -Communist 
'  Finally Mr.  De Martino,  Secretary of the PSI,  opening the 36th Congress of 
the Party on 10 November,  summed up the Socialist position as follows  : 'It 
is absurd to continue to apply discriminatory criteria to the election of Italian 
representatives to Community bodies in the light of principles dating back to 
the times of the Cold War .... We are in favour of admitting not only the 
Communists but all groups that represent in Parliament the country as it 
really is.  None of the workers will believe in the democratic character of 
united Europe if its organizations reflect Europe not as it is but in an arti-
ficial and mutilated form'  (3). 
The Republicans, too,  confirmed they were in favour of admitting the Com-
munists.  Mr.  La Malfa, Secretary of the PRI, told the press on 20 October : 
'When the Italian democratic groups call, as all of them have done,  for the 
election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage,  they accept the 
need for the PCI to be represented in that Parliament. Parliamentarians 
elected by the will of the people cannot be justified in holding back a develop-
ment that will be produced by the will of the people' (4). 
For their part the Communists persisted in their request to be represented 
in the European Parliament.  The arguments put forward at the 11th Congress 
of the PCI included the following : 'Any form of discrimination should be 
banned from the European Parliamentary Assembly at Strasbourg' (5), 
During the Congress, which was held in Rome from 25 to 31 January 1966, 
Mr.  Longo,  Secretary, upheld 'once again,  and in the firmest manner, our 
right,  and the right of all workers' parties such as the PSI and the PSIUP, to 
be adequately represented in the Strasbourg Parliament' (6). 
(1)  'Avanti',  21  October 1965. 
(2)  'Giornale d'Italia', 6-7 November 1965. 
(3)  'Avanti', 11 November 1965. 
(4)  'La Nazione',  21  October 1965. 
(5)  'L'Unitll',  7 November 1965, 
(6)  'L'Unita', 26  January 1966. 
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On 20  October the PSDI reaffirmed,  through the President of the parliament-
ary group of the Chamber,  Mr.  Bertinelli, that the parliamentary forces of 
the extreme Left and of the extreme Right should not be representetl (1).  In 
the party's weekly organ Mr.  Orlandi phrased the problem as follows  : 'If we 
set out,  as in fact we do, from a  judgement on principle, the choice of alter-
natives is a simple one : either to eleat a delegation reflecting the actual 
make-up of the Italian Parliament,  and therefore including the majority and 
all minorities, or to elect a delegation which,  as happens with other States, 
reflects the Italian parliamentary majority' (2). 
The Christian Democrats did not make an official comment on the new position 
taken up by the Socialists.  The party's official organ stated, however, that 
'the PC  I'  s  admission to one of the essential Community bodies cannot but be 
conditional on its displaying a  European will.  It has not done so to date and, 
1  indeed,  is stubbornly refusing to do so in its heated dispute with the EEC' (3). 
But if the party itself would not commit itself,  some of its exponents were 
freely expressing their views on the subject.  For the ex-President of the 
Council,  Mr.  Pella, who addressed a meeting on 22  October on 'A new Italy 
for united Europe', to admit the Communists would be to commit a gross 
political error (4). 
According to Mr.  Bettiol,  Italy could not very well bring to Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg a delegation that included Communists whose foreign policy 
clashed with that of the Centre-Left Government,  and because in that event 
the Italian Government,  which had confined the PCI to the home front,  would 
be obliged to consult the Communists in Strasbourg on its foreign policy (5). 
Mr.  Pedini, member of the European Parliament,  considered it more logical, 
in the transitional phase of the Rome Treaties, that parliamentary represen-
tation should stem from the national parliaments,  and that a directly elected 
Community parliament should stem from a rounded and balanced Community 
existence.  In Mr.  Pedini's view there were two objections to the presence of 
Communists in the Strasbourg delegation,  one political and the other proce-
dural.  The procedural objection lay in the rejection by the Chamber on 17  No-
vember 1955 (and later when the Rome Treaties were ratified) of the request 
that it should apply proportional representation to the elections of the Euro-
pean Parliament,  and in its having voted for majority elections. The political 
objection was that the admission of the Communists -who as a party were 
opposed to the Community - to the European Parliament would heighten the 
(1)  'La Nazione',  21  October 1965. 
(2)  'Socialismo democratico',  24  October 1965. 
(3)  'll Popolo',  20  October 1965. 
(4)  'll Telegrafo',  23  October 1965. 
(5)  'Giornale d'Italia', 28-29 October 1965. 
- 7 -serious crises that already existed by adding further grounds for uncertain-
ty (1).  Mr  0  Folchi felt that any other consideration should be treated as 
secondary to the need for a well-integrated and efficient Italian delegation (2). 
Mr  0  Greggi held that the Christian Democrat Party could not be the tool of 
votes for admitting the Communists  - always openly opposed to efforts to 
unite Europe - to the European Parliament.  He added that the Socialists 
should enter the Italian delegation but that  'political groups that had so far 
belonged to it,  and wih every right,  could not be excluded'  (3). Mr.  Scalfaro, 
Vice-Secretary of. the (;hristian Democrat Party,  thought that to admit the 
Communists into Euro;:-e would amount to a total surrender of principles.  He 
went on to argue that the Italian delegation should reflect 'not so much the 
Government majority as the line-up of all political groups that believed whole-
heartedly in a certain type of free Europe'.  As the Communists were exclu-
ded from this they were also excluded from taking part in the construction of 
a free and democratic Europe.  Mr.  Scalfaro concluded by pointing out that 
the Christian Democrats had nothing further to say on the subject.  'Our party 
has already made its choice ; it stands squarely by it and cannot but draw the 
political conclusions from the position taken up by the other parties if this 
calls into question the need for a clear-cut choice between democratic and 
anti-democratic forces'  (4).  On 2 December,  Mr.  Sarti,  responsible for the 
party's external affairs section,  reiterated its resolve to exclude the Com-
munists (5).  Finally Mr  0  Rumor, Secretary of the party,  speaking in 
Taormina on 9 December at the congress of the European Union of Christian 
Democrats,  stressed his party's intention,  at European level,  to mobilize all 
democratic forces with an eye to the election of members ofthe European Par-
liament by direct suffrage (6). 
The Liberals promptly took up a position both against the presence of Com-
munists in the Italian delegation and against the proposal to a delegation 
confined to the majority.  On 27 October the following statement was issued 
by the PLI'  s  central directorate and in its parliamentary directives : 'The 
PLI cannot cease to take part in the building of Europe together with whole-
heartedly European-minded political movements which in the  aggregate 
reflect the bulk of opinion among the general public and in the Italian Cham-
ber (7). 
(1)  'Giornale d'Italia',  30-31 October 1965. 
(2)  'Giornale d'Italia', 1-2 November 1965. 
(3)  'Giornale d'Italia', 1-2 November 1965. 
(4)  'Giornale d'Italia', 3-4 November 1965. 
(5)  'll Popolo',  3 December 1965. 
(6)  'll Popolo',  10 December 1965. 
(7)  'La Nazione',  28  October 1965. 
- 8  -Interviewed by the press (1),  Mr.  Badini Confalonieri maintained that the 
Communists,  as opponents of the idea of Europe,  could not be allowed to 
to assist at its councils.  The system of election 'based on a list agreed 
between parties that have in common a similar concept of European policy 
and represent the majority of opinion in the Parliament and among the general 
public' should remain in force.  Mr.  CQnfalonieri described the majority 
system slanted exclusively in favour of the Government parties as undemo-
cratic,  Mr.  Gaetano Martino,  President of the PLI, wrote a newspaper 
article (2)  in which he,  too,  rejected Mr.  Orlandi's suggested solution of 
majority representation,  adding that it had been put forward to 'render 
acceptable to the Italian Socialist Party the exclusion of Communists from 
representation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Community.' 
The President of the Republic himself devoted his attention to the problem of 
f renewing the Italian delegation to the European Parliament.  On 23 November 
Mr.  Saragat had a discussion on the subject with the President of the Cham-
ber,  Mr.  Bucciarelli Ducci,  and on 30  November he received a Communist 
delegation consisting of Senator Terracini and Mr.  Ingrao,  chairmen of the 
parliamentary groups of the Senate and of the Chamber,  and Senator Tolloy, 
1 chairman of the Socialist group of the Senate. It thenlooked as though,  as a 
·'result of the interest of the President of the Republic and of the statement of 
, the President of the Chamber,  the problem would be promptly put on the 
Chamber of Deputies' agenda.  Owing to the crisis in the Government, however, 
the matter had to be put off and it was only on 11 March 1966 that 
Mr.  Bucciarelli Ducci announced,  at a meeting of chairmen of the parliament-
ary groups ,  that by April he would have placed the renewal of the Italian 
delegation on the Chamber's agenda.  During that meeting Mr.  Luzzatto 
(PSIUP) and Mr.  Laconi (PCI) asked for the adoption of electoral systems 
·ensuring full representation of the Assembly and not only of a part, even 
though it reflected the majority.  Mr.  La Malfa (Republican) referred to the 
discussions of his Party's directorate at which the hope was expressed that 
the Italian delegation would be representative of the entire Parliament (3). 
At a further meeting of chairmen of the parliamentary groups held on 20  April, 
Mr.  Bucciarelli Ducci proposed 28  April as the date for voting  on the renewal 
of the Italian delegation.  The date actually agreed, however,  was 11  May. 
Between 20 April and 11  May the positions of all parties were clearly defined. 
On 22 April Mr.  Malagodi,  secretary-general of the Liberal Party and chair-
man of the parliamentary group of the Chamber,  and Senator Trimarchi, 
vice-chairman of the parliamentary group of the Senate,  explained to 
Mr.  Moro,  President of the Council,  the Liberal point of view on the problem 
(1)  'Giornale d'Italia',  29-30 October 1965. 
(2)  Tutti o nessuno ? ,  'Giornale d'Italia',  11-12 November 1965. 
(3)  'Il Carriere della Sera',  12 March 1966  ; 'L'Unita.',  12  March 1966. 
- 9  -of the Italian delegation to the European Parliament (1).  According to the 
Liberals -as confirmed in the Senate by Senator D'Andrea on 27 April during 
the debate on the ratification of the Treaty on the merger of the Executives of 
the European Communities (2)  -under existing conditions the Communists 
could not be accepted in the Italian delegation because they intended to change 
the nature and structm  ....  of the European Parliament.  On the same occasion 
Senator Lussu of the p:;mp insisted that an end should be put to the discrimi-
nation from which the parties of the Left were suffering (3).  Speaking for the 
Communists in Milan on 8  May,  Mr.  Longo upheld the PC  I'  s  right to be re-
presented in Strasbourg.  He accused the Christian Democrat leaders of 
wanting 'once again to avply another form of discrimination against workers' 
movements of the Left and of violating every democratic relation between the 
Government majority and the opposition'.  Mr.  Longo hoped that the other 
parties of the Centre-Left would not bow down to these pressures but would 
recognize the democratic right of the Communist Party, which represented 
a quarter of the Italian electors, to be represented in the European Parlia-
ment.  'This right,' he continued, 'was openly recognized by Mr.  Saragat when 
he was still Foreign Minister.  It would be a serious matter if the political 
movement which appeals to the President's authority were now to violate this 
democratic right of ours. It is high time this was respected.  We want to push 
ahead in Strasbourg, as elsewhere,  with our activities and our united struggle 
for new relations calculated to promote collaboration and peace in Europe, for 
the rights of the working class and for a new pattern to be given to European 
policy' (4). 
The Government coalition parties also definied their positions without however 
succeeding in reaching agreement.  The Socialists and Republicans argued for 
Communist  representation,  while the Christian Democrats continued to 
oppose it.  The Social Democrats proposed a compromise on which the unity 
of the coalition could be re-formed : of the 18 seats falling to the Chamber, 
14 would have gone to the majority and 4 to the opposition in accordance by 
agreement between them.  This arrangement was proposed on 6 May by the 
Secretary of the PSIUP,  Mr.  Tanassi, first to Messrs.  Brodolini and Ferri, 
respectively Vice-Secretary and Chairman of the parliamentary group of the 
Chamber of the PSI,  and then to the Secretary of the Christian Democrats, 
Mr.  Rumor. It was not however accepted (5).  Nor was it accepted in subse-
quent talks held on 9 May between Mr.  Brodolini and Mr.  Ferri, Socialists, 
(1)  'll Corriere della Sera'  1  23 April 1966. 
(2)  Senato della Repubblica  1  Res  oconto sommario,  27 April 1966, 
pp.  10-11. 
(3)  Senato della Repubblica,  Resoconto sommario,  27 April1966, p.  8. 
(4)  'L'Unit:l',  9 May 1966. 
(5)  'Avanti',  7 May 1966. 
- 10  -and Christian Democrats Mr. Rumor, Mr. Gava, Chairman of  the parliamentary 
group of the Senate,  Mr.  Zaccagnini, Chairman of the parliamentary group of 
the Chamber,  Mr.  Piccolo, Vice-Secretary of the Party, and a first step to-
wards agreement was made between Mr.  Tanassi and Mr.  Rumor (1).  In a 
statement to the press following these talks (2)  Mr.  Brodolini stated that the 
Socialists continued to hold that the Italian delegation should reflect all the 
political forces existing in the Italian Parliament and that such a  requirement 
could be satisfied if all the parliamentary groups were to vote an agreed list. 
He added,  however, that 'the Christian Democrat Party had declared itself -
and I deplore this -opposed to such an agreemen~'. Disagreement still re-
mained after the talks held on 10 May between the President of the Council, 
Mr.  Moro,  the Vice-President of the Council Mr.  Nenni,  and Mr.  Rumor and 
Mr.  Tanassi.  On the same date the Christian Democrat parliamentary group 
of the Chamber maintained its anti  -Communist attitude, while the Directive 
Committee of the PSI in the Chamber and the Directorate and parliamentary 
group of the PRI decided to abstain by depositing blank ballot papers.  On the 
morning of the 11th May the Christian Democrat deputies also decided to 
deposit blank ballot papers.  The Liberal deputies,  on the other hand,  nomi-
nated Mr.  Gaetano Martino and Mr.  Cantalupo. 
At the opening of the sitting of the Chamber in the afternoon of 11  May, 
President Bucciarelli Ducci suspended work and called upon the chairmen of 
the parliamentary groups to consult them on the state of the voting.  The 
· representatives of the four Government parties stated that if voting had taken 
place they would have deposited blank ballot papers.  On the resumption of 
work Mr.  La Malfa, Republican,  as the groups had failed to reach agreement, 
proposed that the election be postponed, pointing out at the same time that his 
party was in favour of all groups being represented.  Mr.  Malagodi (Liberal) 
opposed the postponement and insisted on the principle that 'all who believe 
in European unity should attend the European Assemblies, but not those who 
did not believe in it and intended to sabotage it'.  Mr.  Zaccagnini stated that 
the Christian Democrat group would vote for Mr.  La Malfa's proposal,  and 
confirmed that it was against the presence of the Communists.  Mr.  Alicata 
approved the proposal on behalf of the Communists and attacked the Christian 
Democrats and Liberals for their attempts at discrimination.  On behalf of the 
Monarchists Mr.  Covelli objected to a postponement. · Mr.  Roberti of the MSI 
(Italian Social Movement) pointed out that the majority was clearly divided on 
the question and that a postponement servednopurpose. Mr.  Luzatto stated 
that the Socialist Group for Proletarian Unity would have voted for the  pro-
posed postponement, pointing out at the same time that every group present 
in the Parliament should be represented in the European Assemblies. 
Mr.  Janassi, for the Social Democrats,  and Mr.  Ferri, for the Socialists, 
accepted the proposal for a postponement.  This was approved by a large 
(1)  'Avanti',  10 May 1966. 
(2)  'Avanti',  10 May 1966. 
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by the MSI  (1).  The election of the delegation to the European Parliament was 
therefore put off to a date to be subsequently determined. 
2.  The Franco-German talks in Paris 
The Franco-German talks between General de Gaulle and Chancellor 
Kiesinger, which began at the Elys(3e Palace on 13 January and lasted until 
14 January, were the first in the series since the cabinet reshuffle in Bonn. 
The focal points of the talks were European questions and the policy of d(3tente  ' 
in Europe. It was manifestly the intention of both the Chancellor and the 
General to discuss in depth all the political issues that were of common 
interest ; these included relations between Western Europe and the United 
States,  relations between the EEC and Great Britain and the obstacles to 
d(3tente in relations with the East European countries that were raised by the 
problem of German reunification. 
At the close of the two days of talks, both sides expressed their wish to give 
a new meaning to the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 and to co-operate in 
more fields,  especially as regards policy towards the East European coun-
tries.  The talks centred on easing the strain and tension in Germany's re-
lations with Eastern Europe.  German sources stated that the consultations 
should in future bring close agreement between the two Governments on 
policy towards the East.  This co-operation would,  in addition to French 
efforts in the East European capitals, also involve 'mediatory assistance 
vis-a-vis third countries'.  The Chancellor associated himself with General 
de Gaulle's aim of taking the process of d(3tente through understanding on to 
co-operation with the East European countries.  He stressed that the German 
people must continue to trust and remain confident that France,  in its efforts 
to bring about a d(3tente,  did not lose sight of the great aim of German reuni-
fication. 
Opinion in German circles after the political talks was that the meeting 
between the two statesmen had given both the spirit and the letter of the Franco-
German Treaty a new lease of life.  The need for this and the seriousness 
surrounding it had been noted with satisfaction by General de Gaulle.  ~t was 
observed on both sides that there was no fundamental difference on points of 
policy between France and Germany.  On tlre French side it was indicated that 
(1)  Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto sommario, 11  May 1966,  pp.  4-5. 
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despite the differences of view Franco-German co-operation was both 
necessary and desirable in certain fields.  The 1963 Treaty .;as still going 
strong. 
In the field of practical politics, several agreements were reached in addition 
to the arrangements and consultations with regard to East European policy -
which also involved a co-ordination of industrial activity in Eastern Europe : 
the French and German Foreign Ministers had been asked to examine all the 
points discussed between the Chancellor and General de Gaulle and to find 
new fields for co-operatiOJ.l,  Their findings were to be submitted either at 
their meeting in March or during General de Gaulle's visit to Bonn to be made 
in compliance with the Treaty, early in the summer.  These points for dis-
cussion included the questions of harmonization in the fiscal,  energy and 
transport policy fields within the EEC and an examination of economic, finan-
cial and monetary policies.  All these matters were to be discussed both bi-
laterally and with the EEC partners.  There would be a Franco-German con-
ference between Mr.  Debr~ and Mr.  Schiller, Ministersfor EconomicAffairs, 
and Mr.  Strauss, German Finance Minister,  on the subject of steel policy. 
There would be a discussion between Mr.  Schroder and Mr.  Messmer, 
Defence Ministers, on disarmament,  European security and European defence 
policy.  The control of armaments and the future of NATO after 196 9 would 
also be among the points discussed.  In the coming weeks there would be a 
discussion on ways in which the technological and economical gap between 
Europe and America could be bridged.  The EEC partners had to find a way 
of bridging this gap. 
The Federal Chancellor and the French President agreed that the question of 
the future entry of Britain into the EEC would be the subject of consultations 
between the Six EEC States as soon as the individual Governments had 
learned the views of Mr.  Wilson,  British Prime Minister, during his visits 
to the European capitals.  The German Delegation was under no illusion that 
France's terms for Britain's accession to the EEC remained inflexible ; on 
the German side it was said that these difficulties would remain even if 
Britain signed the Treaties unconditionally. 
In Bonn on 16  January,  Chancellor Kiesinger spoke to German and foreign 
journalists about his talks with President de Gaulle.  With reference to 
Britain's entering the EEC, he said that he had reminded de Gaulle of his 
Government's statement and had said that the German Government supported 
an 'open door' policy.  He made this standpoint clear, and he had also drawn 
attention to Germany's own interest in its trade policy links with EFTA. 
There was an exchange of viewpoints on this issue. It was a matter first of 
finding out exactly what the British wanted,  One would have to wait until the 
British Prime Minister had completed his tour of the European capitals. 
The Chancellor said that the greatest single achievement of the Franco-
German talks was the decision that both sides would in future work together 
- 13  -and hold con"sultations about their East European policy.  France had given an 
assurance that she would gladly support the Federal Republic in the latter's 
endeavours to improve relations with the East European countries.  In this 
way relations with the East should become less strained. It was also agreed 
that a bilateral working party should be set up to further the German initiative 
and examine the possibilities of closer co-operation in the technical sphere. 
At his press conferenc._: ,  Chancellor Kiesinger confirmed that the various 
views on relations witr_  the USA  had also come up for discussion during the 
Paris talks.  Germany , ·,mted an integrated relationship and she wanted 
American troops to be present in Europe.  It was, however,  agreed that 
Europe must endeavour to make a substantial contribution to its own defence 
and that Europe needed the protection of the United States.  In his statements 
on relations with the USA,  however, Chancellor Kiesinger struck a  new note. 
He said that he fully agreed with the French President that the Americans in 
Europe represented American interests, but that there were also European 
interests. It had now to be examined where these interests coincided and 
where they clashed. 
The Chancellor concluded by pointing out,  with reference to European unity, 
that the German Government would be making no diplomatic moves towards 
a  European union.  Paris had not gone back to the earlier Fouchet plans. 
De Gaulle had, furthermore,  not repeated his former proposal for closer 
co-operation between the Six on defence policy. 
Mr.  Helmut Schmidt, President in Office of the SPD Group in the Bundestag, 
made a statement on the visit of the Federal Chancellor and Foreign Minister 
Brandt to Paris and on the Chancellor's press conference of 16  January 1967 
in Bonn. 
The talks in Paris had imparted a decisive new impetus to Franco-German 
relations.  The Federal Government had emphasized its earnest concern to 
secure a relationship with Germany's major partner and neighbour in the west 
which best served the national interests of the French and German peoples 
and their common responsibility for peace.  The Social Democrats welcomed 
the confrontation of different opinions to which the Chancellor had referred in 
his public statement and the mutual respect shown for each other's viewpoints ; 
they saw this as a fundamental prerequisite for lasting friendship.  The out-
come of the Paris talks would substantially help to make clear Germany's 
desire for peace. 
Consistent co-operation on the East Europe policy was regarded as being of 
special importance.  The Federal Republic of German.y could in this context 
rely on the support of France's prestige in the East European countries. It 
would be advantageous to the German Government to take its future steps in 
Eastern Europe in close consultation with the French Government.  In this 
connexion,  the possibility of joint economic initiatives in Eastern Europe 
·could also be considered at a later-date. 
- 14-European policy would have to go forward step by step ;  yet the great aim of 
European unification had not to be forgotten. 
On 18 January, Chancellor Kiesinger made a statement in the Bundestag 
about the Franco-German talks.  He noted with satisfaction that the Paris 
talks had given the Franco-German Tr~aty a new impetus.  This represented 
far more than a  simple improvement in the relations between the two peoples 
and the two Governments.  It was the opinion of the initiators of the Treaty 
that there were special reasons for creating between the two countries 
relations that were stronger than those with other peoples.  This principle 
had again been confirmed at the talks.  · 
Chancellor Kiesinger confirmed that German relations with the United King-
dom and the United States had been discussed.  He had explained to the 
President that an extension of the Common Market - through the accession of 
the United Kingdom and other States - would be in line with the wishes and 
the economic interests of the Federal Republic of Germany and that the 
requirements of German foreign policy and security made it clear that co-
operation with the USA  was necessary.  A series of joint endeavours had been 
agreed on to ensure that the Treaty - to use President de Gaulle's words -
might come out of the shade and into the light again.  This involved progress 
in building the European Communities and an early merger of the Executives. 
For this reason, both partners had welcomed Italy's invitation to a meeting 
of the Six on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Rome Treaties. 
It had also been decided to step up co-operation in all those spheres covered 
by the Franco-German Treaty including the industrial and economic spheres. 
With a view to joint progress and a  co-ordination of the work done,  meetings 
would be held, prior to the next meeting in June or July this year, between 
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs,  Defence,  Finance,  Economic Affairs, 
Science, for questions affecting young people and between the French 
Minister for Education and the German plenipotentiary. 
In the debate that followed,  Mr.  Majonica spoke first for the CDU/CSU 
coalition.  He welcomed the outcome of the Paris talks as the resumption of 
a close dialogue with their French neighbour.  The visit had created an 
atmosphere of goodwill in which it was possible for them both to agree and 
disagree. 
Mr.  Majonica emphasized that it was part of the national German policy to 
think first of the solution to the German question.  This question should not 
be seen in isolation .but only in relation to the attempts to achieve d~tente 
between East and West.  The French diplomatic action in talks and initiatives 
in Eastern Europe kept the German question under careful and constant 
consideration ;  this prevented any 'freezing' of the status quo and brought 
the Governments there·face to face with the reality that unless the German 
problem was solved, no lasting peace could be secured. 
- 15 -Speaking for the Social Democrats,  Mr.  Schmidt expressed his Group's 
satisfaction at the outcome of the Paris talks.  No one had expected spectacular 
results from the first meeting ;  yet it had to be emphasized that it had been 
clearly stated by both partners where they were in agreement in their 
appreciation of the situation and on the possibilities of future joint action. 
In this connexion,  Mr.  Schmidt recalled a statement made by Mr.  Couve de 
Murville,  French Foreign Minister,  shortly before the Chancellor's visit to 
Paris to the effect that foreign policy had nothing to do with mood or incli-
nation, but was based far more on the interests and ideals of each individual 
country. He  said that the  better  one  knew  and  discussed one's  own  and 
one's partners interests  and the  more familiar  one  became with  them, 
the  more  clearly it stood  out  where those  interests differed  and where 
common sense dem~ded  that one respect these differences. It was also clear 
at this stage in what fields co-operation was possible, desirable or simply 
necessary ;  this applied not only to relations with Paris but equally to 
relations with London or Washington. 
Speaking for the FDP opposition,  Baron von KUhlmann-Stumm  said that the 
FDP wholeheartedly supported the Government's efforts to activate Franco-
German relations.  An improvement in the atmosphere would facilitate the 
discussion in good faith of every issue on which France and Germany still 
disagreed. It was not advisable to regard these differences of view as being 
of lesser moment than in the past.  This would weigh down the Franco-German 
relations with unreasonable expectations.  Anyone in favour of co-operation in 
good faith with France had first to work for a  clarification of the standpoints 
and then go on to a rapprochement. 
He was also in favour of improving relations with the East European countries 
and he advocated diplomatic relations with them.  The FDP Group expressed 
particular concern only as regards the impending negotiations on the  acces-
sion of the United Kingdom to the Common Market.  He had urged the German 
Government to press for understanding on France's part to facilitate the 
earliest possible entry of the United Kingdom and other European States into 
the EEC.  At a celebration on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 
Saar's reincorporation to the Federal Republic, Chancellor Kiesinger again 
spoke of Franco-German friendship.  He emphasized that the new German 
Government had taken  as its principal task to work for a policy of peace and 
understanding between peoples.  The Federal Government particularly sought 
a  European peace settlement which included the great aim of German reuni-
fication.  In seeking this end, the German Government fully agreed with the 
French view on future European policy ; through a  joint Franco-German 
policy for peace, many difficulties could be overcome.  (Bulletin der Bundes-
regierung No.  5,  18 January 1967 and No,  6,  20 January 1967  ;  Deutscher 
Bundestag,  5 Electoral Period, 84 Session,  18 January 1967  ;  Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung,  16,  17  and 20 January 1967  ;  Die Welt,  17 January 1967; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  18 and 20  January 1967  ;  Le Monde,  22  and 23 Janu-
ary 1967  ;  Industriekurier,  31  January 1967  ) 
- 16  -3.  Mr.  Mansholt warns against premature attempts to institutionalize 
political consultations between the Six 
At a press conference held on 6 January at The Hague,  Mr.  Mansholt, Vice 
President of the EEC Commission wan1ed against hasty decisions on European 
collaboration. It would be premature to set up new political institutions in this 
sphere while agreement had still not been reached on a number of political 
problems such as that of defence relations with the United States and the 
Eastern bloc,  disarmament and the easing of tension.  Moreover, the Six 
would be wrong to commit themselves to a political venture without taking 
account of the countries that might join the Community.  Mr.  Mansholt was 
also against opening political talks with Britain at the present juncture as it 
might lead that country to feel there was no point in backing the argument 
that the European Community needed strong institutions.  With an eye on 
possible entry by Britain,  it was best at the outset to concentrate on clearing 
up  certain problems of principle ;  the other questions would have to be dis-
cussed after Britain had entered the Common Market. 
Mr.  Mansholt opposed,  not a summit meeting of the Six,  but premature 
institutionalization of political consultations between them.  He still rejected 
the Fouchet plan for political union between the Six.  The Dutch Government 
should, he felt,  hold on to its positions since no change had in the meantime 
taken place.  (Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant of 7 January 1967, V. W. D.  of 
11 January 1967) 
4.  Mr.  H.  von der Groeben,  German member of the EEC Commission, on 
European policy 
At a meeting in Tonistein on  16 January 1967,  Mr.  Hans von der Groeben, 
member of the EEC Commission,  attributed the lack of enthusiasm for the 
European cause that has emerged in the past among a section of the German 
public to the achievements of the economic upswing in the Federal Republic 
and the resulting doubt as to whether European integration was needed to 
sustain this momentum.  The growing competitiveness of Germany's EEC 
partners has also played a part, as well as disappointment,  at the failure to 
make German reunification more acceptable to the rest of the world through 
the policy of European integration. 
Mr.  von der Groeben pointed out that in order to surmount the cu,rrent eco-
nomic recession new life would have to be breathed into the integration policy. 
While it was true that the German market was big enough to permit most 
undertakings to have productive units of the size nowadays necessary,  such 
a degree of concentration on a domestic market could only be  achieved at the 
- 17 -cost of competitiveness.  Conversely, by intervening in the sphere of compe-
tition the public authorities could prove a hindrance to technically necessary 
concentration and rational production.  The common European Market alone 
was large enough to permit of effective concentration under conditions of fair 
competition.  Moreover,  it was only through integration of the economies in 
the Common Market that American competition could be met. 
Mr.  Hans von der Groeben also expressed the hope that negotiations would 
this year be held at ministerial level on the 'European company'.  He favoured 
the creating of a form o1  company based on European law which would make 
it easier to regroup national productive forces within the wider framework of 
the EEC.  He drew attention to the interests of smaller firms which were 
handicapped as compared with large-scale undertakings which enjoyed wider 
scope for setting up new companies, for mergers and investments in other 
EEC countries and were therefore often satisfied with the existing  legislation. 
It was not only in the field of taxation of companies constituted under Euro-
pean law that the EEC was faced with difficulties  ;  the right of workers to 
have a say in management as recognized in the Federal Republic was a 
special problem.  There was a danger that,  as a result,  European companies 
would prefer to establish themselves outside the Federal Republic.  (Industrie-
kurier,  17 January 1967) 
5.  European integration in the electoral programmes of the major Dutch 
Parties 
European integration is not made the subject of dispute in the campaign for 
the coming elections of the Second Chamber of the States General. 
The Catholic People's Party (KVP)  states in its election programme that it 
is 'determinedly pursuing its efforts to ensure the advent of a united Europe 
that is democratic,  supranational and outward-looking~ 
The Labour Party (PvdA) wishes to facilitate entry to the EEC by Great 
Britain and other democratic countries, to strengthen the position of the 
European Commission and to endow the European Parliament with real 
parliamentary powers so as to ensure that integration is carried out on 
democratic lines. 
One of the aims pursued by the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy 
(VVD)  under Article 13 of its programme is '  European integration, provided 
it is based on democratic principles and does not lead to the setting up of a 
continental bloc'.  Its objective is a united Europe in which the executive 
power would be answerable for its policy to a  European Parliament  elected 
by direct universal suffrage with which it would jointly exercise legislative 
- 18-powers.  A Court of Justice would have to ensure respect of Community law. 
The party is striving to foster collaboration between all European liberal 
movements with a view to making the new Europe as liberal as possible. 
According to the VVD' s  election programme, the efforts being made to 
achieve European unity within the Atlantic Community will require consider-
ation to be given in the near future to the enlargement of the EEC through the 
admission of other European countries.  Since so little advantage is being 
taken of the scope  offered by the Rome Treaty for setting up a supranational 
structure, a watch should be kept on essential nat~onal interests.  The VVD 
continues to favour a transfer of powers to supranational institutions where 
the interests at stake can be more effectively defended at European level.  To 
this end,  efforts should be made to turn the European Parliament into a 
strong institution elected by direct suffrage. 
For the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP),  the essential features of the politi-
cal unification of Europe on a supranational basis - still at the initial stage in 
the present Communities -are that it should be democratic,  outward-looking 
and supranational, while respecting the individual character of each country. 
Considerable efforts will have to be made to ensure more effective parlia-
mentary supervision.  Integration must be rounded off by the merger of the 
Communities and the direct election of members of the European Parliament. 
The ARP considers it essential not only to continue removing restrictions on 
trade between the EEC countries and between the various trading blocs of the 
world,  but also to put into effect a Community policy harmonized at financial, 
economic,  social and fiscal level.  Closer European co-operation on funda-
mental and applied research should also be fostered. 
The adhesion to the Community of Great Britain and of other democratic 
countries is another objective of the ARP. 
As regards the political form to be given to European integration,  it is better 
for the time being to wait rather than to commit oneself to a choice that would 
run counter to the principles of the European Treaties. 
Finally, the Christian Historical Union (CHU)  'will pursue its efforts to 
hasten the advent of political and economic unity in a  Europe no longer 
confined to the Six and endowed with a democratic organization based on a 
European Parliament elected by direct suffrage and armed with real powers. 
(Source :  Election programmes of the political parties) 
- 19-6.  Opposition to the election of a  European Parliament by universal suffrage 
The National Office of 'l'Union des jeunes pour le progres' (Young People's 
Union for Progress - a pro-government movement) has stated its opposition 
to the election of a  European Parliament by universal suffrage. 
The case for the elect  ton of a  European Parliament by universal suffrage had, 
said the UJP, been re-opened by the opposition during the pre-election period. 
Whether the opposition's motives were demagogic or stemmed from ignorance, 
this attitude certainly did not spring from any serious analysis of the political 
situation in Europe.  It went back to the long-standing and very comfortable 
illusion that to make progress towards uniting  Europe all that was necessary 
was to modify the institutional machinery without going into the fundamental 
issues.  In fact,  far from resolving these issues said the UJP,  it would create 
fresh ones. 
In conclusion the UJP considered that the election of a Parliament was, under 
present circumstances,  a specious argument.  The question of political inte-
gration was in its view only a question of method and was of secondary im-
portance. It should not be used to side-step the real issues.  (Le Monde, 
26  January} 
7.  Professor Grewe addresses the External Policy Association 
In an address delivered before the External Policy Association at Bad Godes-
berg on 25  January 1967, Professor Grewe,  Ambassador to the NATO 
Council, warned against acceding to the non  -proliferation treaty, put forward 
by Washington and Moscow to prevent the spread of nuclear arms,  in so far 
as it prohibited the creation of a  European strategic nuclear force and,  in 
addition,  hampered the peaceful use of atomic energy. 
Professor Grewe reached his conclusions in the light of a historical analysis 
of the direct and indirect effects of nuclear arms on international policy 
since the end of the war.  He concluded that nuclear arms widened a nation's 
freedom of action only to a limited extent, but that on the other hand there 
was no denying the relative security it offered a nuclear power against 
'nuclear blackmail'.  Professor Grewe thought it significant that Mr.  Wilson 
had said no more,  since taking up the duties of British Prime Minister, about 
dispensing with British nuclear arms.  In Professor Grewe's opinion, coun-
tries without nuclear arms would in the future hardly be in a position to play 
the role even of a secondary major power. If the oligopoly of nuclear powers 
is backed by a non-proliferation treaty,  States with no nuclear arms of their 
own are bound to fall behind in the technical and scientific fields.  Such  a 
- 20 -situation would also have economic consequences.  Nations without nucle·ar 
weapons could not defend themselves against those who possessed them.  In 
framing their defence policy,  only three approaches remained open to them 
unarmed neutrality,  accepting a guarantee of protection from a nuclear ally, 
or creating a strike force jointly with a  community of nations with similar 
interests. 
Professor Grewe dismissed the first approach as unrealistic ;  the second 
suffered from both the drawbacks which had plunged NATO  into its present 
crisis -the growing predominance of the major nuclear partner and uncer-
tainty as to whether this partner would carry out ·its guarantee if it meant 
del:vering up  its people to nuclear destruction.  The third approach, the 
creation of a  joint strike force,  was in Professor Grewe's view the only 
long-term answer that offered Europe any chance of security and indepen-
dence.  At the same time it was the most difficult to put into effect as it 
meant reviving the movement for European unity.  It too,  therefore, provided 
no  solution for the immediate future.  Professor Grewe went on  : 'We have no 
choice,  therefore, but to maintain the existing state of affairs for the next 
few years, that is, to keep up the protective relationship with the United 
States ..... We must not however lose sight,  in the face of what are today 
unavoidable necessities,  of what we should strive for in a later future. It is 
therefore essential to keep open the third option,  which alone is turned to the 
future :  European co-operation aimed at political union and defence of 
Europe by means of a  common nuclear strike force. '  (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung,  26  January 1967) 
- 21  -II. ECONOMIC POLICY AND  ECONOMIC SECTORS 
1 .  The future of the European company 
In an interview which he gave to 'La vie fran~aise', Mr. A. Roux, Vice-Pre-
sident of the Conseil national du patronat fran~ais (French Management 
Council), discussed amalgamations between companies within the Common 
Market. 
He considered that a European company statute would be very satisfying 
intellectually, but he pointed out that new legal structures had never led 
automatically to economic revolution.  Even without a European company sta-
tute, furthermore,  amalgamations were possible and he quoted the example 
of the Agfa-Gevaert merger. 
At the same time, very large-scale international companies both existed and 
prospered without there having been any need to frame special legal rules, as 
was the case with Royal Dutch Shell or  Unilever.  Legal expedients were of 
course to hand to allow international mergers to be effected without difficulty. 
But it. would be unthinkable for two major companies in the same branch of 
the economy - say, one French and one German - to sign a merger agree-
ment straight off if they did not know each other well enough and if they dis-
trusted each other ; the latter feeling would be quite normal because of their 
systematic eompetition with each other on every market. 
To enable two such companies to get to know each other better, provision 
would have to be made for interim stages, operations on a limited scale, (tech-
nical agreements, floating joint subsidiaries, division of manufacturing 
operations) which would serve, as it were, as stepping stones to a concen-
tration. The fundamental point, however,  was that Articles 85  and 86  of the 
Treaty of Rome and the implementing regulations issued in recent years by 
the EEC Commission acted as powerful legal and psychological brakes which 
practically prohibited companies from stepping over the stones. It was 
strictly prohibited by law fer firms to split up a territory or share a market 
even if they did so for only the most limited time and their agreement affect-
ed only the most limited area. In theory other forms of co-operation (ratio-
nalization agreements, technical agreements etc. ) were authorized, but,  in 
fact,  they were subject to an approval which was never final ; the effect of 
this was that they were a priori suspect. Psychologically, this was disas-
trous : no one was ready to take the first step even when there was no specific 
ban on an agreement. 
The major companies felt no inclination to sign contracts which,  once pu-
blished,  might be retroactively indicted, not because they were illegal when 
they were signed, but because they might subsequently be  com~ illegal because 
- 23 -of an unforeseeable  development in economic circumstances. The act of 
publishing such a contract would furthermore be inconsistent with trade 
secrecy and companies would obviously be reluctant to incur the criticism 
their policy would attract where such a policy's legality or illegality were 
dependent on extraneous factors. 
_These legal psychological brakes acting in conjunction with each other had an 
even more serious effect. Contacts in depth between European industrialists 
had gradually been discontinued to the point where they had almost ceased to 
obtain and it-would be very difficult to take them up again. To restore condi-
tions conducive to a genuine dialogue -without which there could be no real 
Common Market -the EEC Commission should follow the example of the 
French Government ; in other words,  it should conduct a full-scale public 
relations campaign to persuade industrialists in the Six countries that any and 
every effort that they might make to  pool their resources would be not only 
legitimate but favourably viewed. 
As for current thinking on dominant positions in Europe, Mr. A. Roux thought 
that the concentration of European industry had made so little headway and 
that the structures of European industry were still so far from the optimum 
that the very idea of a dominant position in Europe today appeared rather 
meaningless. If,  at some future date, one were to come up against a rigid 
application of Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome with respect to dominant posi-
tions,  Community industry, whose inadequate concentration,  compared with 
the big international groups, was exactly what it was suffering from,  would be 
weakened even further . 
Mr. Roux hoped that if dominant positions did come to obtain in Europe,  they 
would be considered not solely in relation to the Common Market but in rela-
tion to the spread of world economic power. 
Against this background,  Mr. Roux also wanted the concept of the 'industrial 
group' at the European level to be defined at a very early date,  so that the 
creation of the Common Market would not,  as it qid at present, penalize those 
companies that had had the foresight to create a European infrastructure 
before the Treaty of Rome was signed. Under the Brussels regulations, these 
companies were obliged to regard the different businesses that they controlled 
within the Europe of the Six as outsiders or third parties. It  had to be admitted 
that this was not really reasonable. (La Vie fran9aise,  20 January 1967) 
2.  The thirty  -first International Agricultural Show (Grline W  oche) opens in 
Berlin 
On the occasion of the opening of the thirty-first International Agricultural 
Show in Berlin on 27  January 1967, Mr. Hocherl, Federal Minister for Food, 
- 24  -said that it had to be remembered when one was assessing progress towards 
integration in Europe, that ten years had still not elapsed si.nce the Rome 
Treaties were signed. Any unbiased observer would be amazed at what had 
been achieved so far. He emphasized the importance of the common agricul-
tural policy from. the point of view of integration and stressed that the pro-
gress in developing a common agricultural policy for Europe had brought 
pressure to bear with ever increasing urgency on the issues of harmonizing 
fiscal, transport and trade policies. 
Recent political achievements made it clear that the economic potential of the 
European Communities exercised a considerable power of attraction which 
was particularly felt in those countries whose individual character was 
strongly pronounced for reasons both of geography and history. He warned of 
the danger of Europe's becoming isolated politically from the rest of the 
world and said that with the economic growth in the major and vital areas of 
the economy, there would be a considerable increase in trade with other parts 
of the world - more so than would result from the spread of traditional 
sovereignty. 
Speaking on the same occasion Mr. Hall  stein, President of the EEC Commis-
sion,  said that only a modern agriculture organised over a wide area had any 
chance of remaining the first and most important supplier of the population of 
Europe. He stressed that the common agricultural policy had from the outset 
been a reform movement to help agriculture to become integrated as part of 
the economy ; he. hoped that during the current Kennedy Round negotiations on 
agriculture,  satisfactory solutions could be found. 
Mr. Bauknecht, Vice President of the German Farmers Union (Deutscher 
Bauernverband) said that the farmers of Europe were working for very little. 
He  stressed that the average income of those engaged in agriculture remained 
below that of comparable occupational groups, despite the mechanization and 
rationalization of farms and despite a great increase in production. In view of 
the pressures on the world market, European agriculture had not been able to 
pass on increasing costs to the consumer in the same way as was possible in 
other branches of the economy. As a result, the capital accumulation of the 
farmers was inadequate and their investments were therefore reduced. In this 
connexion,  Mr. Bauknecht warned against the inflow into agriculture of outside 
capital. 
Mr. Christian Thomson, Danish Minister for Agriculture,  spoke of the in-
creasing difficulties in trade in agricultural products between the EEC and 
countries outside the Community. He pointed out that the Federal Republic had 
always press.ed for understanding between the two markets of the ECSC and 
EFT  A. This was true both as regards the ultimate agreement and as regards 
co-operation in the 'waiting period' with reference to which Germany attached 
great importance to Article 110 of the Treaty of Rome on the harmonious de-
velopment of world trade. (VWD-Europa, no.  20,  27  January 1967) 
- 25  -3.  Federal Associati<!n of the German Wholesale and Export Industry warns 
against a return to protectionism 
The Federal Association of the German Wholesale and Export Industry called 
upon the Federal Government and on the EEC Council of Ministers to ensure· 
that the EEC's offers in the Kennedy Round would reflect, not a longoutdated 
national protectionist spirit but an outward-looking trade policy as laid down 
in the EEC Treaty. 
The German export industry was deeply disappointed to note that the EEC,once 
a real driving force, had now become, if anything,  a brake on external trade 
policy and on the removal of customs barriers. A trade policy hampered by 
. tight economic planning and controls would merely place a burden on the 
Kennedy Round. The Federal Association criticized the inadequacynot only of 
the EEC's agricultural offers in the Kennedy Round,  but also of the mandates 
for negotiating on industrial products. The special requirements embodied in 
the lists of exceptions, which were qf a protectionist nature, had already led 
to a danger of  withdrawal lists from other GATT partners. It was now feared 
that,  in contrast to the far-reaching aims originally striven for in theKennedy 
Round,  only negligible results could be expected. 
The submission of withdrawal lists would hit German external trade particu-
larly hard since the lists included export goods in respect of which German 
industry was clearly highly competitive. The Federal Association therefore 
requested the EEC Council of Ministers to make a careful  scrutiny of the 
EEC' s lists of exceptions in the industrial sector. This was the only way to 
prevent the other GATT partners from reducing their offers still further. 
In addition,  it was essential to ensure in the closing stages of the Kennedy 
Round that the lowering of customs duties was not offset by the setting up of 
obstacles equivalent in effect. The Federal Government had, for example, 
already been criticized by the United States for taxing motor vehicles on the 
basis of cylinder capacity. The new directives issued by the Federal Ministry 
of Transport also offered wide scope for criticism of the Federal Republic in 
the matter of non-tariff measures. It could well be the case that excessive 
technical requirements merely served to protect home manufacturers from 
foreign competition. (Die Welt,  26 January 1967) 
4.  Professor StOdter, President of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce,dis-
cusses policy on Europe 
On 30 December 1966 Professor StOdter, President of the Hamburg Chamber 
of Commerce, gave an address at a gathering  of the 'Versammlung eines 
Ehrbaren Kaufmanns' . 
- 26-He began by pointing out that there were unmistakable signs of a loss uf con-
fidence in EEC policy. The future alone would show how  serio~F·1:v the mem-
.bers of the Common Market took the progress of the EEC. Tht.c  w:l>,'  tl!e 1965 
1 crisis had been overcome had shown that the EEC had meanw1·: lt·  ,.ruck firm 
roots and to some extent had acquired laws of its own. 
The EEC carried a heavy responsibility in the Kennedy Round. It  ~tad to 
realize that its GATT partners were now waiting for its offers and that it 
would itself have to bear the cost of a failure of the negotiations. A failure 
would seriously weaken GATT, which for almost twenty years had been the 
mainstay of progress in trade policy. A breakdown of the Kennedy Round would 
re-open the door to protectionist and bilateral approaches, not least in the 
form of preference agreements . 
Professor Stodter also spoke on development aid which,  in his view, had re-
cently reached a critical stage. It was therefore essential to thrash out all 
the problems connected with development aid and development policy with a 
view to arriving at a clear idea of future policy in this field. 
On 19 January 1967, Professor Stodter told Hamburg reporters that Great 
Britain would sooner or later have to join the European Economic Community. 
The Hamburg Chamber of Commerce felt that the EEC was coming more and 
more under the influence of national interests. Because the EEC was manifest-
ly substituting 'national unreasonableness' for 'European wisdom' in the Coun-
cil of Ministers, there was a danger that co-ordination would be  arrived at 
merely by adding together the various national claims. (Die Welt,  20 January 
1967) 
5.  Conference in Milan on the EEC's medium-term economic policy and the 
Italian plan 
A conference on the EEC' s medium-term economic policy and Italian planning 
was organized at the Chamber of Commerce in Milan from 19-21 January by 
tqe CISMEC (Centro Italiano Studi sul Mercato Comune Europeo -the Italian 
Common Market Association). 
Senator Caron, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Finance, presen-
ted the first general report on 'National planning and European integration'. 
He began by emphasizing that the operative realities in the Western European 
economies were today such that it was no longer possible to face up to econo-
mic policy problems without the institutional machinery needed to organize 
the market. He therefore concentrated on two special problems affecting Italy. 
On the one hand, there was the problem of raising industrial production levels 
to the optimum and thereby keeping Italian industry competitive with other 
- 27  -countries. On the other, there was the problem - fully covered in the plan -
of the Mezzogiorno whi~h had to be overcome along European lines. Mr. Caron 
concluded by stressing the importance assumed by problems connected with the 
dynamics of an economic policy whose sweep was increasing all the time and 
particularly those cmmected with the progressive and larger-scale realization 
of the common market for products,  capital and labour. 
Mr. Guido Colonna,  a member of the EEC Commission, explained the under-
lying theory and basic emphasis of the EEC's first medium-term economic 
policy programme. Th....,  underlying principles,  on which the Community pro-
gramme was based,  stemmed from market economic criteria ; it was the free 
play of the market that had to be guaranteed ; where it did not operate fully, 
this had to be remedied. He pointed out that European economic integration 
could no longer turn back. 
Mr. Giuseppe Petrilli, President of the ffii  {Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale - Industrial Redevelopment Institute) discussed the function of the 
public enterprise in a planning policy ; he pointed out,  inter alia, that planning 
was designed to reconcile the various forms of state intervention and the 
action taken by private enterprise within the framework of a general develop-
ment plan that was worked out by the public authorities. The plan, he said, 
had to take due account of the economic imperative both in the sense of the 
·optimal combination of  production factors and in the sense of a better utiliza-
tion of the resources available to the collectivity, planning here functioning as 
the necessary tool. 
Mr. Giunti, ·Deputy Director of the 'Confederazione generale dell' industria 
italiana' (Confederation of Italian Industry) and President of the Management 
Group on the EEC's Economic and Social Committee, pointed out that Italyhad 
been faced with proposals put forward by the first Centre-Left Government 
which ran counter to the principles of planning and this had necessitated, on 
the part of private enterprise, a vigorous defence of the principles which had, 
until then, brought out all the efficiency of private enterprise in serving the 
purposes of society at large. Up until that time,  it had been clearly recogni-
zed that such an attitude on the part of private industry was vulnerable to any 
prejudiced opposition to action designed to make up for los17 ground and make 
good the failure to co-ordinate which had occurred in the rapid expansion of 
the Italian economy. In evidence of this, he said that at the European level, in 
a calmer and more constructive atmosphere, private industry had,  through 
the union of the industries of the European Community during this period, 
expressed its own unanimous support for the initiatives the EEC was taking to 
work out planning arrangements which, without any absurd authoritarianism 
and without compromising the efficiency and competitiveness of the free mar-
ket,  constituted the framework for action by the Governments and by  the Com-
munity institutions to bring about a balanced development of the market itself. 
Dr. Giunti went on to say that the Italian development programme gave rise to 
considerable concern ; it required a large contribution in terms of new indus-
trial investment in public enterprises and it greatly increased the recourse 
- 28  -that would have to be had by all the public sectors to the capital market ; by 
· implication this made it more difficult for private enterprise to find the same 
kind of finance that had, in the last 20 years, made possible the economic and 
social development of Italy. 
Mr. Pedini pointed out that despite the efforts that Italy had made so far,  it 
still had no internally co-ordinated technical or occupational training policy 
that was properly dovetailed with the technical and occupational policy line of 
the other community countries. It was through education that it would be 
possible to make the most of Europe's cultural potential and, hence, to bridge 
the technological gap between Europe and the United States of America. 
Mr.  Zagari, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
pointed out that until the introduction of national planning it had been clear 
that this could only really achieve its objectives if it were cast in a European 
mould. Mr. Z agari went on to point out that economic planning should have 
two basic aims : 
a)  increasing incomes and 
b) redressing territorial and social imbalances. 
Mr. Agostino Bignardi, Vice-President of the Confederazione generale dell' 
agricoltura (National Farmers Union) discussed the problems of Italian agri-
culture against the background of the national plan and of the EEC' s medium-
term economic policy. Italian agriculture, he said, had gone into the Commu-
nity imbued with the desire to find and to do something new, but, in fact,  at 
ten years distance from the founding of the Community,  certain essential sec-
tors in Italian agricultural production appeared to have been sacrificed. The 
fact that the two fundamental factors which should have guaranteed balance 
within the EEC for all the productive sectors in the member States, that is 
a)  the organization and support of the market and 
b) the structural policy, had been adversely affected not only by technical 
difficulties but also by political difficulties. One of the latter was the special 
situation enjoyed by France. 
The speaker concluded by expressing the hope that France and Germany would 
respect the  spirit and the letter of the Treaty of Rome. (Il Sole,  24 Ore - 20, 
21,  22 January 1967) 
- 29-ID.  EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
1.  Great Britain's accession to the EEC 
a)  The Socialist International in favour of Britain's accession to EEC 
European Socialist leaders  foregathered  unofficially in Rome  on 4  and  5 
January,  within the  framework  of the Socialist International.  During the 
course of the  meeting some of the main issues  of the  moment were 
discussed including :  the  changes  that had taken place in various  coun-
tries  since the International Socialist Congress  held  in Stockholm in 
May  1966  (especially the  socialist unification  in  Italy and  the  accession 
of the  Social  Democrats  to the  German  Government)  ;  relations  between 
the  EEC  and the  EFTA  countries  since  the  British decision to  resume 
talks  with the  Six  ;  relations  between  communist and  socialist parties 
and  developments  in the  communist world  and the problems  of inter-
national  monetary liquidity. 
Relations  between  EEC  and  EFTA were discussed by Mr.  George  Brown, 
British Foreign Minister.  He  repeated the  British Government's  decision 
to set the ·necessary machinery in motion to  ascertain the  attitude of 
the  EEC  countries  to the possibility of  a  British request for  entry into 
the  EEC.  He  also referred to  such special problems  as  the future  role 
that  Europe,  once  united economically and politically,  could play on 
the  international  chessboard and to the Italian proposal to bridge the 
technical  gap between  Europe  and the  United  States.  On  this last point, 
he  said that this  gap  could be overcome by an enlarged Community  and 
he  recalled that Britain spent a  larger proportion of its budget on 
scientific  research than any other  country in  Europe. 
Many speakers commented on Mr.  Brown's speech, including Mr.  Nenni, 
Italian Vice-President of the Council,  Mr.  Brandt, German Foreign Minister, 
Mr.  Nilsson, Swedish Foreign Minister and Mrs.  Golda Meir, former Israeli 
Foreign Minister.  Mr.  Nenni,  considered that Britain's accession to EEC 
- 31 -would be a major event not only economically but also politically because 
there could not be an economic Community without a political Community. 
He added that the heaviest responsibility that de Gaulle had to bear was not 
that he had left NATO but that he had sabotaged the Community Europe. 
Without a political and economical Community,  Europe would cease to exist; 
it could be no more than a mere geographical expression.  He said  'This is 
why we want Britain in the EEC; we hope to see Britain increasingly engaged 
on the road towards a real political Community' .  With reference to the pos-
sibility of a further French veto,  Mr.  Nenni said '  if the elections in March 
leave the French political situation either unchanged or nearly so, the Five, 
Great Britain and the other countries ready to join EEC,  could together take 
the road to economic and political integration without being held back by 
General de Gaulle as they were following his veto in 1963.' There was a need 
for $erious discussions on all sides and deeds must follow words : 'We,  in 
Italy,  he said, will do our utmost to achieve this end.' 
Mr.  Brandt,  German Foreign Minister,  said he did not share Mr.  Nenni' s 
view on going ahead with the EEC without France in the event of a further 
veto on Britain's accession.  In his view the Gaullist objections should be 
borne in mind with a view to overcoming them.  He then said that his Govern-
ment wished to reactivate Franco German co-operation; this was necessary 
not only for their two peoples but for the whole of Europe.  'If this co-opera-
tion is not set in motion again Europe will not come into being'.  He added 
however that the work of consolidating EEC should not preclude the accession 
of countries which,  like Britain and others, wished to join. 'with full respect 
for the established principles of the Treaty of Rome. ' 
At the Press Conference held at the close of the meeting,  Mr.  Bruno 
Pittermann, Austrian President of the Socialist International,  stated that the 
Socialist leaders were optimistic about relations between EEC and Great 
Britain.  He  added that those taking part in the conference were agreed that a 
consolidation of relations between EEC and EFTA could proceed rapidly and 
that the Socialists trusted there would be greater prpgress towards a wider 
Europe.  ('La Stampa' 5 January 1967; 'Avanti',  5 and 6 January 1967; 'La 
voce repubblicana' 6 and 7 January 1967). 
On 31  October 1966 a five-hour 'teach-in' was held in Oxford on Britain's 
entry into the European Economic Community.  This was organized in the 
Oxford Union,  the celebrated debating club of the University of Oxford, by 
the British Council of the European Movement. 
- 32-The fjrst speaker, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas,  Labour MP and President of the · 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg,  advocated 
British accession to EEC at an early date.  The climax of the debate was the 
speech in reply by Mr.  Duncan Sandys ,the Conservative 'European' who was one 
of the founder members of the European Movement.  He dealt particularly with 
the arguments of the Labour Governme'ht; he said it could serve no useful pur-
pose for the Government to say that Britain wanted to join EEC provided cer-
tain conditions were met.  Britain, he said,  would have to sign the Rome 
Treaty.  Referring to Mr.  Wilson's statement on Europe of March 1966 in 
Bristol,  Mr.  Duncan Sandys said that if Mr.  Wilson were not ready to accept 
the club rules and pay the membership subscription, it was pointless to apply 
for accession.  Similarly, he came out against the singular logic of the oft-
repeated argument used by the Labour Government to the effect that Britain 
had the same claim to concessions as the Six had bargained over at the outset. 
It was erroneous to suppose, he said, that Britain could demand the same 
conditions as the founder nations. 
On 1 November 1966,  Mr.  Wilson said in the House of Commons that in the 
event of Britain's joining EEC,  special attention would have to be paid to the 
question of the food import factor in the cost of living.  He said : 
'I thought that there was fairly general agreement in the House that most if 
not all of us would wish to join the European Economic Community if we can 
get terms that safeguard British and Commonwealth interests ...... Certainly 
we take the position that our situation must be protected in regard to the cost 
of food,  and its effects on our balance of payments, the cost of living,  wages 
and the rest. Certainly this must be one of the questions to be discussed ..... 
I said that we must continue to have the right to buy cheap Commonwealth 
food as we always have. ' 
Speaking at a meeting of the Conservative Party in Yorkshire on 6 November 
1966,  Mr.  Heath, leader of the Opposition,  outlined his programme for Bri-
tain's accession to the Common Market.  Mr.  Heath again demanded that 'the 
Government should clearly state its intention to join the EEC.  It should be 
stated that Great Britain wanted to become a wholehearted member and that it 
wished to play its part in bringing about an all-embracing unity in Europe. 
Mr.  Wilson must state his willingness to sign the Treaty of Rome and to agree 
to the EEC's agricultural policy.  When the Government had thus made its 
standpoint known,  it should spell out the issues concerning which it felt nego-
tiations still had to be conducted.  Mr.  Heath himself felt that negotiations 
were needed on the following points : 
(a)  Great Britain's debt to the International Monetary Fund amounting to 
£800m.; 
(b)  the future of the sterling area; 
- 33-(c)  defence agreements for Europe; 
(d)  the political future of the enlarged Community. 
On 10 November 1966  Mr.  Wilson made a further move towards the Common 
Market.  He informed the House that the Government would be calling the 
Heads of Government of the EFTA countries to a conference in London in or-
der to examine with them the problems of the accession of the EFTA countries 
to EEC.  With reference to the future European policy of the United Kingdom, 
Mr.  Wilson said that the Labour Government had decided that a new high level 
approach must now be made to see whether the conditions existed for fruitful 
negotiations on Britain's joining EEC.  Great Britain, he said, was ready to 
join EEC, provided that essential British and Commonwealth interests were 
safeguarded.  He continued as follows  : 
' In recent weeks the Government have conducted a deep and searching review 
of the whole problem of Britain's relations with the EEC,  including our mem-
bership o{ EFTA and of the Commonwealth.  Every aspect of the Treaty of 
Rome itself,  of decisions taken subsequent to its signature,  and all the impli-
cations and consequences which might be expected to flow from British entry, 
have been examined in depth. 
In the light of this review the Government have decided that a new highlevel 
approach must now be made to see whether the conditions exist - or do not 
exist -for fruitful negotiations,  and the basis on which such negotiations could 
take place . . . . . .  I want the House, the country,  and our friends abroad to 
know that the Government are approaching the discussions I have foreshado-
wed with the clear intention and determination to enter EEC if,  as we hope, 
our essential British and Commonwealth interests can be safeguarded.  We 
mean business ...•....  ' 
In reply to a  question concerning France's attitude,  Mr.  Wilson said : 
'This is a matter of the most supreme importance for Britain, for Europe 
and for our partners in many other areas. In a matter of this degree of im-
portance, I do not think that we can settle the issue by the mutual exchange of 
Press conferences.  I believe that it requires direct discussion.  Therefore, I 
should not feel that any particular statement made in a Press conference ne-
cessarily represented the last word on such a question . . . . . .  I should not 
myself feel that these talks should be primarily or to any large extent concer-
ned with questions of European defence.  In the past, many of the difficulties 
arising about the economic negotiations have been clouded by defence consi-
derations.  Some of the very large difficulties which the right hon.  Gentleman 
himself faced were due to certain conditions at that time being laid down on 
defence issues which no longer apply.  NATO is the right place for talking 
- 34-about those questions.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the right 
place for talking about defence.  There is nothing in the Treaty of Rome about 
defence,  and I hope that the hon.  Gentlemen opposite do not want us to make 
it more difficult by seeking to write a large defence section into the Treaty of 
Rome. 
Naturally we will consider what should be said to the House.  The purposes 
which all of us jointly have in mind here would not be served by going into too 
much detail about the terms and conditions that we should want to put into our 
discussions with Europe. If we have to have negotiations in the House first 
before discussions start, obviously our position will be greatly weakened.  The 
House knows that there are deep problems about entry into Europe, more of 
which were raised at Question Time earlier,  and I am not sure that it would 
be wise to go into greater detail than I have already ......  ' 
Mr. Wilson went on to say : 
'  I recognize that our association with the United States has been one of the 
very big problems.  The position of Britain as an Atlantic Power has been one 
of the big drawbacks to French acceptance of British entry. ' 
At the traditional Guildhall Banquet on the occasion of the assumption of office 
of the new Lord Mayor of London on 15  November 1966,  Mr.  Wilson explained 
with reference to his new move towards British entry into EEC ,  that the tide 
was right, the time was right and the wind was right. Without specifically 
mentioning France, he made the reservation that he did not guarantee that this 
new approach would be successful.  Mr.  Wilson announced on this occasion 
that Mr.  Michael Stewart,  Minister for Economic Affairs, would shortly be 
setting up a Consultative Committee,  comprising representatives from in-
dustry on which all the problems that would rise from Britain's possible entry 
into the Common Market could be discussed.  Mr.  Wilson added that Europe 
should not remain at the stage of the three existing Communities; he outlined 
his idea of a new European Technological Community which would put Europe 
in a position in which she could place greater reliance on her own resources. 
The Common Market should, furthermore,  not be a self-satisfied club for the 
wealthy nations; it had also a responsibility to the world at large which should 
be reflected in increasing assistance for the developing countries.  · 
Apart from eighty committed anti-Europeans in the Labour Party, the British 
Parliament was now in principle in favour of Britain's joining the EEC.  This 
emerged from a two-day commons debate (16  November until late on 18 No-
vember) which Mr.  Wilson wound up with a third statement of the Govern-
ment's intentions. 
- 35-Mr.  George Brown,  British Foreign Minister,  began his speech by making it 
clear that if Britain joined EEC ,  the Government would make no change in its 
foreign policy and it would preserve its ties with the USA.  Mr.  Brown re-
peated the already well-known standpoint of the British Government that Bri-
tain
1 s  special needs had to be taken into account : this,  in particular, applied 
to the difficulties in connexion with the agricultural policy· in the event of 
British entry. If Britain did join EEC, everything would be done to avoid any 
devaluation of the pound.  Every care would be taken to achieve a healthy ba-
lance of payments.  Mr.  Brown went on to say: 
1  The issue today is not "Do you join Europe"; we have always been there.  The 
issue is : "Can we play such a  rMe that from hereon the Continent shall be 
unified and we shall be effectively a leader of it ? " 
Let us also recognize the increased prosperity and influence in the world 
which unity would bring to Europe.  Let us remember that all three parties in 
this House are committed to the achievement of the great unity of Europe. 
One thing,  speaking in economic terms, I would have thought is common to us 
all. If the prosperity of this country is to be assured and British industry is 
to plan for the expansion which is funda,mental to this, we must have a large 
market outside these shores -a market to which we have immediate and un-
restricted access. 
We are a country of 54 million people.  Our membership of EFTA almost 
doubles the size to 100 million.  An expanded Common Market,  which could 
include not only ourselves but also our EFTA colleagues, the Irish Republic, 
and countries which are now members of EEC,  would be a market of some 
280 millions. 
That potential market is v~ry prosperous.  Its gross national product is 
£125, OOOm.  With this assured base,  industry within the Community,  including. 
British industry,  could compete approximately on equal terms with the giants 
of the US  and the Soviet Union.  This would open up opportunities for invest-
ment in  ,many directions. 
1 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home,  Opposition spokesman on Foreign Affairs, called 
upon the Government to state clearly whether it was ready to accept the Rome 
Treaties.  This would certainly be the first question that General de Gaulle 
would ask.  The same was true of the acceptance of the common agricultural 
policy.  Mr.  Heath repeated that he would support any serious approach.  He 
regretted, however, that the debate would be conducted in an atmosphere of 
- 36  -skepticism and unreality as long as the Government refused to tackle the real 
obstacles and speak plainly about the reasons for France's opposition.  He 
added that it was erroneous to suppose that the principle of supra-nationality 
had vanished from the structure of the EEC since the Luxembourg Agreement 
on the common agricultural market. 
In his closing speech,  Mr.  Wilson said that the debate had shown,  with refe-
rence to Britain's bid for entry to the EEC, that it was not only the Govern-
ment but also the Parliament that meant business.  As Mr.  Brown had said 
the day before,  Mr.  Wilson stressed that Britain would stand firmly by the 
Atlantic Alliance because a  separate Europe:tn nuclear deterrent would weaken 
NATO and threaten any hope of an understanding with the East.  The British 
link with Europe would not involve any supra-national, political or defence 
policy obligations which went beyond the provisions of the Treaty of Rome for 
the European Economic Community. 
At the annual meeting of the Anglo-French Society  .~hich was held in London 
on 30  November 1966,  Mr.  George Brown said that today more than ever be-
fore the unity of Western Europe depended on an ever-closer union between 
England and France.  Such a union would, he sincerely hoped, prosper even 
more favourably within a  European Economic Community that was larger than 
the present one. If  we,  in Western Europe,  wished to stand up to the industrial 
giants of the USSR  and the USA  and compete with them, then we had to work 
and go forward together.  This was, he said, the fundamental economic reason 
which should command our support for an enlargement of the European Econo-
mic Community which would also include Great Britain. 
As for what Britain could contribute to the Community,  Mr.  Brown went on to 
say that it was not only an additional market of 54m.  people, but also its ad-
vanced technology and industrial experience. 
The EFTA conference which Mr.  Wilson convened in London on 5 December 
1966 was successful insofar as it agreed to the British Government's new ap-
proach to Europe.  The conference had also helped to allay the fears of certain 
EFTA countries that Britain might leave the other EFTA States in the lurch. 
Mr.  Wilson took advantage of the conference to repeat that Britain did notre-
gard joining EEC as a step towards an automatic political alliance or as a 
defence policy commitment.  He stressed that he would not in any way be 
speaking in the name of the other EFTA  countries  during  the soundings he 
would be taking.  In his view the problems of British entry to the EEC hinged 
mainly on the EEC agricultural policy, the cost of British imports and the 
cost of living, the balance of payments and capital movements. 
- 37-On 21  December, the committee, set up by the Confederation of British In-
dustry to examine the p~actical effects of Britain's joining EEC, submitted 
a detailed report on these questions. It emerged from this that British in-
dustry had almost no reservations in supporting Britain's entry.  The Com-
mittee further stated that the EEC Treaty and the methods by which it was 
applied in the Community would be acceptable, provided that reasonable. 
transitional arrangements could be made. It therefore felt that negotiations 
on Britain's accession to the EEC should be initiated as soon as  possible. 
On the question of foreign trade(!), the CBI report noted that in 1965 some 19 
per cent of British exports, worth £ 900m. ,  went to the EEC countries as 
compared with £419m.  in 1958.  This relatively sharp increas~ in British 
exports to the EEC ,  despite the increasing EEC external tariffs, was a clear 
sign that the British economy was, on the whole,  competitive. 
The forfeiture of the EFTA customs preferences vis-A-vis the EEC countries 
was not regarded as very serious.  With reference to commonwealth trade, it 
was noted that over the last twenty years the share of total British exports to 
the members of the preference area, including South Africa and Ireland, had 
fallen steadily. The CBI Committee pointed out that at the last Brussels nego-
tiations progress had already been made in many areas where Commonwealth 
interests were involved and these threads could be taken up again,  while -
above all in the African parts of the Commonwealth - the reservations about 
association with the EEC had been disappearing since Nigeria had become 
associated and Kenya,  Uganda and Tanganyika were seeking some form of 
association with the EEC. 
The compilers of the CBI report also pointed out that in principle Britain's 
agricultural policy and that of the EEC sought the same objectives in different 
ways.  Britain guaranteed the prices of the thirteen most important commodi-
ties; these were reviewed annually in negotiations between the National Far-
mers' Union and the Government.  The State paid the farmers the difference 
between the guaranteed price and the average market price. In the Community, 
on the other hand,  the 'prices of imported commodities were brought up to the 
level of the EEC product prices by means of levies.  In each case, however, 
the Government provided assistance in the form of subsidies that were not 
linked to prices.  The report came to the conclusion that if Britain joined the 
Common Market,  its food bill would cost the consumer some £625m.  per 
year; the figure given by the National Farmers' Union in their report was 
£685m.  Similarly,  Unilever Ltd., in a survey on this subject, came to the 
conclusion that food costs for the consumers would go up to £ 500m.  only or 
approximately 9 per cent giving an increase in the cost of living of approxi-
mately 2. 5 per cent. 
(1)  See,  for details of the CBI report, The Times of 22 December 1966. 
- 38 -The CBI report also dealt  with the question of the ECSC market, transport 
and the problems of finance. The rOle of sterling as a reserve currency was 
not regarded as a problem insofar as it consolidated the balance of payments. 
This point received the highest priority in the recommendations of the CBI 
Committee which also called for reliable economic growth without inflation. 
It further recommended : 
(a)  an adjustment of the existing economic legislation to that of the Community; 
(b)  the examination of new laws along EEC lines; and 
(c)  a harmonization of the taxation system with developments in the EEC. 
The Consultative Committee on European affairs,  recently announced by the 
Government, had in the meantime been set up.  The Chairman was the Minis-
ter for Economic Affairs and its duty was to advise the Government on its 
negotiations for accession to EEC. It comprised several representatives of 
key industrial organizations of the trade unions,  industry, the banks,  insuran-
ce companies and trade organizations.  The Consultative Committee held its 
first meeting on 9 December 1966.  (Weekly Hansard, House of Commons, 
Parliamentary Debates,  no.  701  of 28  October to 3 November 1966 and no.  72 
of 4 November to 10 November 1966.  The Times,  11  and 17 November 1966, 
6,  17 and 22  December 1966; The Guardian,  11 and 17 November 1966; Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung,  11  November 1966; Die Welt,  18 November 1966; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  19 November 1966). 
2.  Relations between Europe and the United States 
Mr.  R.  Marjolin, Vice-President of the EEC Commission, stated in an address 
delivered before the Paris Faculty of Law on 20 January that Europe's central 
problem lay in its relations with the United States. The customs union and com-
mon agricultural policy did not of themselves suffice to make of Europe an 
economic union that could deal as an equal with the United States or enter into 
close collaboration with it without running the risk of becoming submerged. 
This was the crucial problem for Europe. If it was desired to catch up with 
US  industry, efforts should be concentrated on remedying four major weaknes-
ses  : (i)  the smallness of industrial enterprises which were a long way from 
being on the European scale; (ii) the lack of a  European capital market which 
could cater for the needs of such enterprises; (iii) the relative scarcity and 
unco-ordinated nature of scientific and technical research; (iv) the national 
character of economic development policies. 
Mr.  Marjolin saw the answer in co-ordinating the policies of member States. 
Could this be done within the existing institutional framework ?  He personally 
thought so.  The existing institutions had already permitted considerable pro-
gress to be made and would continue to do so  until people's minds were ready 
- 39-to accept institutions of a federal type.  Setting aside all theoretical disputes, 
it had to be realized that there was no alternative - only European unity would 
permit the economy to attain the continental scale necessary if freedom of de-
cision was to be preserved. If young Europeans wanted to remain masters of 
their fate  and responsible in their own sphere, they should wish to see the 
idea of union between the European peoples asserting itself increasingly,  and 
more convincingly than hitherto,  at the expense of national interests, trends 
and prejudices. 
The moment would come when,  within each member State of the Communit~, 
major decisions would be taken in the light of the part they would play in con-
solidating European unity. (Le Monde,  22-23 January 1967). 
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PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITY 
I.  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Work of the Committees in January 
Political Committee ( 1) 
Meeting of 20 January in Brussels:  Perusal and adoption of memoran-
dum by President Edoardo Martino concerning the procedure  laid 
down in Article 238 of the EEC Treaty for the conclusion of associ-
ation agreements between the Community and third countries, unions 
of States or international organizations. 
Perusal of draft report by Mr.  Schuijt on the activities of the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community in the single Executive.  Resignation 
of Rapporteur. 
Perusal of preliminary draft report by Mr.  Dehousse on the  Com-
munity's relations with third countries and international organizations. 
External Trade Committee ( 2) 
Meeting of 16 January in Paris:  Perusal and adoption,  in the presence 
of the High Authority of the ECSC,  of draft Opinion by Mr.  Bech on 
problems relating to the coal and steel markets. 
Perusal and adoption,  in the presence of the EEC Commission,  of 
draft Opinion by Mr.  Vredeling on the organization of the international 
sugar market. 
-41-Meeting of 23 January in Brussels:  Discussion, in the presence of 
the EEC Commission,  on the current negotiations in GATT {Rappor-
teur: Mr.  Kriedemann). 
- Appointment  of member responsible for  following  up  relations 
between the Community and Austria; 
- Appointment of member responsible  for  following  up  relations 
between the Community and Spain; 
- Appointment of member responsible  for  following  up  relations 
between the Community and the Maghreb. 
Agricultural Committee (3) 
Meeting of 10 January in Brussels:  Submission and examination of a 
draft report by Mr.  LUcker on the problems involved in concluding 
a  world sugar agreement. 
Examination and approval of a  draft Opinion QY  Mr.  Briot, to  be 
referred to the Internal Market Committee,  on a  draft  directive 
concerning the approximation of laws of the member States on wheeled 
farm tractors (maximum speed,  seating and load platforms). 
Meeting of 17 January in Brussels:  Statement by Mr.  Mansholt,  Vice 
President of the EEC Commission,  and discussion,  with particular 
· reference to the state of progress on the Kennedy Round and discus-
sion of the EEC Commission proposal concerning the common organi-
zation of the cereal,  sugar and pigmeat markets. 
Examination and approval of a  draft report by Mr.  LUcker on  the 
problems involved in concluding a  world sugar agreement. 
Approval of a  draft report by Mr.  Richarts on a  regulation amending 
Regulation No.  14/64/CEE with regard to the calculation of import 
prices and of the levy on products made from beef or veal. 
Examination of a  draft Council regulation on interim measures with 
regard to the application of the common prices in the cereals sector. 
Examination of a  draft Council regulation concerning measures in-
volved in the common market organization in the sugar sector  for 
1967/68. 
-42-Social Committee (4) 
Meeting of 3 January in Brussels: Statement by Mr.  Levi Sandri,  Vice 
President of the EEC Commission,  on the social policy  1 decisions 
taken at a  meeting of the Council of Ministers on 19 December 1966 
and a  discussion on this subject. 
Meeting of 11-12 January in Brussels:  Examination of the EEC Com-
mission proposals concerning Regulations  Nos. 3 and 4  on  social 
security for migrant workers (Rapporteur: Mr.  Troclet)  - Working 
Party for the Opinion of the Committee on the most recent meeting 
of the Council of Ministers. 
Meeting of 18 January in Brussels:  Examination and adoption of the 
draft report by Mr.  Troclet and Mr.  Dittrich on the resumption of 
the activity of the Community in the social sphere following the  Con-
ference of the Ministers for Social Affairs of 19 December 1966. 
Meeting of 24  January in Brussels:  Examination and adoption of part 
of the draft Opinion by Mr.  Carcaterra on a  draft Council regulation 
to harmonize certain social provisions concerning road traffic. 
Resumption  of  the examination of the EEC Commission proposals 
concerning Regulations Nos. 3 and 4  (Rapporteur: Mr.  Troclet). 
Internal Market Committee (5) 
Meeting of 11  January in Paris:  Examination of and vote on the draft 
report by Mr.  Wohlfart on a  directive concerning wheeled farm trac-
tors. 
Examination of the draft report by Mr.  P.  A.  Blaisse on the steel 
market and on matters affecting the coal market; this following the 
statement made by the President of the High Authority to the European 
Parliament on 29 November 1966. 
-43-Meeting of 20 January in Brussels:  Discussion with the High Authority 
on current competition issues in the ECSC and,  in particular,  the 
findings of the inquiry conducted following the oral question put  by 
Mr.  Berkhouwer on the plans to set up steel agencies in Germany, 
selling agencies for the products of Sidmar,  Usinor-Sollac,  etc. 
Resumption of the examination and adoption of the draft report  by 
Mr.  Blaisse on the steel market and on matters affecting the  coal 
market,  this following the statement by the President of the  High 
Authority to the European Parliament on 29 November 1966. 
Economic and Financial Committee (  6) 
Meeting of 12 January in Paris: Joint meeting with the Internal··Market 
Committee to discuss the ECSC High Authority Memorandum concern-
ing the Community's General Objectives for Steel for 1970, the steel 
market and certain questions affecting the coal market; this following 
the statement made to the European Parliament on 2 9 November 1966 
by the President of the High Authority.  Examination of the report by 
Mr.  Kriedemann on the Community's General Objectives for Steel 
for 1970. 
Meeting of 20 January in Brussels: Adoption of the  report  by  Mr. 
Kriedemann on the Community's General Objectives for Steel for 1970. 
Committee for Co-operation with Developing Countries (7) 
Meeting of 16 January in Paris:  Discussion on the results of the 
meeting of the Parliamentary Conference of the Association in Abidjan 
and discussion on the results of the two fact-finding and study missions 
undertaken by a  delegation of the Committee after the Abidjan meeting 
(Cameroon and Chad from 15 to 22  December,  Niger and Upper Volta 
from 15 to 21  December 1966); representatives of the EEC Commission 
were present. 
Discussion with the EEC Commission on the problems connected with 
the activity of the European Development Fund in the sphere of tech-
nical assistance for the General Hospital in Mogadiscio. 
-44-Transport Committee (8) 
Meeting of 16 January in Brussels: Examination of the draft report 
by Mr.  Jozeau-Marigne on the EEC Commission proposal to  the 
Council for a  directive on standardizing the regulations on the duty-
free entry of fuel contained in the tanks of commercial vehicles. 
Examination of a  preliminary draft report by Mr.  Carcaterra on the 
UNIR plan and on the introduction of capacity regulations for transport 
by navigable waterway. 
Discussion on the EEC Commission proposal on certain social pro-
visions affecting road transport (Rapporteur: Mr.  Laan). 
Meeting of 26  January in Brussels:  A.doption,  in its final form,  of 
the draft report by Mr.  Jozeau-Marigne on a  directive on standard-
izing the regulations on the duty-free entry of fuel contained in the 
tanks of commercial vehicles. 
Examination of a  draft report by Mr.  Carcaterra on the UNIR plan 
and on the introduction of capacity regulations for transport by navi-
gable waterway. 
Discussion on the draft report by Mr.  Laan on the EEC Commission 
proposal on certain social provisions affecting road transport. 
Energy Committee (9) 
Meeting of 13 January in Brussels:  In compliance with instructions 
from the European Parliament,  a  discussion was held on the nuclear 
energy .responsibilities of the merged executives and an Opinion was 
forwarded to the Political Committee, the latter being the responsible 
committee. 
Examinatjon of the statement by the President of the ECSC High Au-
thority on the situation in the coal and steel sectors. 
Appointment of a  draftsman for an Opinion to be referred to  the 
Internal Market Committee, the latter being the committee concerned  .. 
Adoption of an Opinion on the energy policy aspects of the reports. 
Statement by the High Authority on the state of progress in work on 
-45-coal policy in preparation for the meeting of the Special Council of 
Ministers on 7 February 1967. 
Research and Cultural Affairs Committee (10) 
Meeting of 19 January in Brussels:  Discussion with representatives 
of the CEPCEO (The Western European Coal Producers'Association) 
and with representatives of other organizations on the problems of 
scientific and technical research in the coal industry. 
Health Protection Committee (11) 
Meeting of 17 January in Brussels:  Discussion with experts repre-
senting manufacturers and consumers concerning the EEC Commis-
sion proposal to the Council for a  directive on jams,  marmalades, 
jellies and chestnut paste, 
Budget and Administration Committee ( 12) 
Meeting of 27 January in Brussels: Examination of a  draft supplemen-
tary research and investment  budget for Euratom for 1966;  repre-
sentatives of the Euratom Commission were present. 
Examination and adoption of the draft report by Mr.  Merten. 
Examination of a  draft Opinion by Mr.  Aigner, to be referred to the 
Political Committee,  on the rMe of the Euratom Commission in the 
single executive; representatives of the Euratom Commission were 
present. 
Examination of the action to be taken by the Councils on the draft EEC 
and Euratom budgets for 1967 as amended by the European Parlia-
ment and on the Parliament's resolutions on certain budgetary ques-
tions: representatives of the EEC and Euratom Commissions were 
present, 
-46 -Legal Committee (13) 
Meeting of 13 January in Brussels:  Discussion on the legal protection 
afforded to private individuals under the European Treaties (Rappor-
teur: Mr.  Deringer).  Statement by Mr.  Dehousse on the application 
of Community law in the member States. 
Committee for Associations ( 14) 
Meeting of 17 January in Brussels:  Examination and adoption of the 
draft of a  supplementary report by Mr.  Faller, rapporteur,  on the 
regulation covering trade in fats between the Community and Greece. 
Examination of the results of the second meeting of the joint EEC-
Turkey Parliamentary Committee. 
Examination and adoption of a  draft report by Mr.  Brunhes,  rappor-
teur,  on the recommendations of the Joint EEC-Turkey Parliamen-
tary Committee with reference to the First Annual Report of  the 
Association Council. 
Joint Parliamentary Committee 'EEC-Turkey' 
Second session of 6  and 7 January in Ankara:  Perusal of working 
papers drawn up by Mr.  Erez for the Delegation of the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey,  and by Mr.  Brunhes for the Delegation of the 
European Parliament,  on the first annual report of the Council of 
Association. 
Discussion and adoption of four recommendations for forwarding to the 
European Parliament and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 
certain problems connected with the application of the Association 
Agreement: 
- operation of the institutions; 
- trade relations between the EEC and Turkey; 
- application of the financial protocol; 
- emigration and occupational training of Turkish workers. 
-47-II.THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE-
AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 
Debate on statement made by Mr.  Wilson,  British Prime Minister 
At its session in Strasbourg from 23-27 January,  the  Consultative 
Assembly  of the  Council of  Europe was  addressed inter  alia  by 
Mr. Harold Wilson, British Prime Minister, who made a  major speech 
on European affairs during the debate on general policy. 
Mr. Harold Wilson,  British Prime Minister.  began by referring to 
the central themes of European history a  century ago and now. With 
reference to what had been done by European countries in the field 
of international co-operation,  he said 'this effort can never achieve 
its full purpose,  whether in terms of development or of peace,  unless 
we learn the way to build up,  through a  more real unity,  our common 
economy and our mutual political strength.' 
Mr.  Wilson believed 'that British entry and the involvement of other 
EFTA countries,  whether by entry or association,  will of themselves 
contribute massively to the economic unity and strength of Europe.' 
He said 'the interests of Europe as a whole •...• will be served  as 
equally as our own separate interests will be served,  by creating a 
greater and more powerful economic Community. I have always made 
clear that,  in my view,  the concept of a  powerful Atlantic partnership 
can be realized only when Europe is able to put forth her full economic 
strength so that we can in industrial affairs speak from strength to 
our Atlantic partners. Let no one doubt Britain's loyalty to NATO and 
the Atlantic Alliance. But I  have always said that loyalty must never 
mean subservience still less must it mean industrial helotry under 
which we in Europe produce only the conventional apparatus of modern 
economy, while becoming increasingly dependent on American business 
for the sophisticated apparatus which will call the industrial tune  in 
the 70's and 80's.' 
Mr. Wilson considered that in the years ahead 'the unity of Europe is 
going to be forged,  and geography, history and sentiment alike demand 
that we play our part in forging it - and working it. 'There might, said 
Mr. Wilson,  be those who believed that to widen the Community would 
be to weaken it or to dilute •••.  its institutions; to this he replied 
'widening ••.• based on change,  will mean not weakening but streng-
thening.' 
Mr. Wilson gave the facts concerning Britain's economic recovery 
and its balance of payments.  'And besides an economy growing  in 
-49-strength we bring all that British technology has to offer. Let us not 
be defeatist about Europe's technological contribution compared with 
that of the United  States' ....  he said and added 'we have to see that 
the European industry of tomorrow does not become dependent on an 
outside technology,  with all that can mean in terms of industrial power 
and independence.' 
Mr. Wilson said 'Britain would be prepared to accept the Treaty of 
Rome subject to the necessary  adjustments  consequent upon  the 
accession of a  new member and provided we receive satisfaction on 
the points about which we see difficulty ••.• Clearly there have got to 
be  adjustments  to the treaty to cover  such  questions  as  British 
membership  of  the  institutions,  with  appropriate  representation; 
provision for  an  appropriate  number  of  British votes  on the 
Council  of  Ministers ;  and no  doubt  other  changes  such  as  the 
percentage  and  contributions  to  the  Community budget  and  funds. 
We shall  be  discussing the  various  difficulties which  we  see  in 
accepting,  without  reservation,  a  number  of the  policies  which 
have  been worked  out  by  the  Community over the  years,  and  it 
is  clear  also  that  such  questions  as  the  time-table  on  which  we 
should be  applying various  provisions  of the treaty is  different 
from that  laid  down  in the treaty because  of the  lapse  in time 
since the treaty was signed. But provided that the problems that we 
see can be dealt with satisfactorily,  either through adaptations of the 
arrangements made under the treaty or in any other acceptable manner, 
then the treaty itself would not be an obstacle. And those rules  to 
which we set our name and seal - those rules we will observe. 
Of course the Treaty of Rome has difficulties for us as it had  diffi-
culties for everyone of the original signatories. We have this advan-
tage,  that in the 10 years since the treaty was signed,  it has  been 
possible for us to study not only the text but the way in which it  is 
operating,  what we might call the common law as well  as the statute 
law,  and we are encouraged by the results of our study. 
It is still too early in our tour to draw conclusions from our discus-
sions. At the end of the day,  it will be for the British Government  to 
decide,  in the light of the best appreciation we can make of the prob-
lems that lie ahead,  and the hopes of overcoming them,  whether  it 
will be right for us to enter into definitive negotiations for entering. 
If this is our decision,  I hope the negotiations will be on a minimum 
number  of broad issues and not on an infinity of details. Many of the 
details,manyofthe consequential decisions -important though they be -
can best be settled on a  continuing basis from within the Community. 
Nor can the ultimate decision be based on a  computerized analysis of 
finally balanced economic calculations. 
Mr.  Wilson referred to the problems created particularly by the fi-
nancial aspects of the Community's agricultural policy for these, he 
-50-said,  would mean a  financial contribution which would fundamentally 
affect the balance so painfully worked out two years ago. But he said 
'these problems are there to be overcome. I believe they can be over-
come,  given the same spirit of constructive ingenuity,  tolerance and 
understanding,  give and take,  which have animated the relations  of 
the Six members in their dealings with one another from the outset.' 
Mr. Wilson concluded by saying 'if we do fail. •.• the fault will not lie 
at Britain's door. But the cost,  and above all the cost of missed op-
portunities,  will fall on everyone of us.' 
In reply to questions,  Mr. Wilson said 'we envisage the future devel-
opment of Britain's relations with and within Europe as being not only 
economic ....  but political as well.  1  He said that from  the  British 
standpoint 'there are certain problems on the economic side. I  see no 
political problems about entry.' He also thought that with regard to 
the common agricultural policy, the financial regulations would require 
consequential amendment on the entry of any new member. He believed 
with reference to these problems,  that 'given the right good will, we 
can solve them.  1 
In connexion with a  point about the qualified majority,  he said  that 
Britain would carry out all the agreements reached  by  those  who 
founded the Community. As to the political future of Europe,  the Prime 
Minister thought it would be wrong, since these were matters of contro-
versy within the Six to express a  view in favour of one or other for-
mulation. But he stressed that if Britain joined the Common Market, 
the British Government  'would do its level best with you to see that 
we obtain a  solution '. Mr. Wilson rejected the idea of an association 
between Britain and the EEC which would be  'a very half-heartedand 
defeatist solution.' 
During the resumed debate on general policy which followed 
Mr. Wilson's speech,  the importance of British entry into the Common 
Market was stressed by those who took the floor and the very definite 
stand taken by Mr. Wilson in favour of European unity was welcomed. 
Mr. Willy Brandt,  Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany,  spoke of the policy of detente,  reconcilia-
tion,  co-operation and unity in Europe. It was from this standpoint 
that he discussed German policy vis-a-vis East-Germany and the streng-
thening of the existing European Communities. To achieve the econo-
mic and political unification of Europe was one of the main goals of 
German policy. It was a  question of strengthening and widening the 
European Communities and Germany's object was to strengthen her 
co-operation with East European nations on a  scientific and cultural 
plane and where possible in the political field.  Mr. Brandt also re-
peated his earlier affirmation  that Germany would like to see  the 
-51 -extension of the EEC by other States, for example Great Britain and the 
EFTA countries. Britain's accession,  he said,  would be consistent 
with Germany's concept of the widest possible co-operation. It  would 
also be in line with her own interests. 
Mr. de Broglie,  French Secretary  .of State in the Foreign Ministry, 
explained France's European policy. Europe,  he said,  must try to 
amount to something through its own efforts,  in its own interest, on 
the basis of European realities to serve European ends. France was 
working for a  growing solidarity between the Six and for the consti-
tution,  between the Six,  of a  coherent grouping which would concern 
itself with security,  with  the political and technical spheres and its 
aid to the third world. 
Mr.  de Broglie then spoke of the policy of rapprochement with  the 
East European countries which was necessary to achieve a  peaceful 
solution to the German problem.  He stressed the progress that had 
been made in the last fifty years in terms of Europe's awareness of 
its own identity. France,  for her part,  would continue to work so that 
Europe might,  through a  vigorous and essentially European policy, 
become a  moral force of the first magnitude. 
At the close of the debate,  the Assembly adopted a  resolution in which 
it expressed its conviction that the enlargement of the EEC was  a 
fundamental element in the ever closer union between all European 
States which was the essential aim of the Council of Europe. It wel-
comed the efforts of the British Government to explore the possibil-
ities of British membership of the European Economic Community. 
It hoped that membership or association would be extended to the other 
members of EFTA and expressed the wish  that  these  approaches 
would be favourably received by all the members  of  the  Common 
Market. The Assembly stressed the importance for Europe of follow-
ing a  policy which would facilitate the development of better relations 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and East European countries. 
It was convinced that only a  strong and united Europe could hope  to 
participate effectively in the world affairs. It therefore considered 
that the Council of Europe should encourage the steps taken with  a 
view to the accession or the association of Great Britain and the other 
EFTA countries to EEC as soon as possible; that Europe had a  par-
ticular responsibility for the creation and exploitation of a  general 
climate of detente; that the machinery of the Council of Europe should 
be utilized to a  greater extent than hitherto to achieve the above  men-
tioned aims.  (Official documents of the Council of Europe) 
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a)  Belgium 
Belgium's European Policy 
During the debate held in the Senate on the foreign affairs and external trade 
budget  between  17  and  19  January,  numerous speakers brought up the 
subject  of European affairs . 
Mr.  Moreau de Melen (Christian Socialist) pointed out in his report on the 
foreign affairs  budget that the European Community's success in the econo-
mic sector, confined as it was to a limited number of partners, did not appear 
to  coincide fully with the aims set up by the signatories to the Rome Treaty. 
Not only had the political progress of European unification clearly failed to 
keep pace with economic development in the Six, but several  important Euro-
pean countries had so far remained outside the Community of the Six. 
In an address to the Senate Mr. Harmel, Foreign Minister, underlined the 
importance 'of building Europe wherever there was a  chance of doing so
1 
•  A 
distinction had to be made between economic Europe, military Europe and 
political Europe. The major aim would beyond doubt remain an integrated 
Europe built around the Treaty of Rome. In the  meantime, however, frag-
ments of Europe ought to be erected wherever progress was possible. The 
organization of military Europe was, however, on the decline because in times 
of peace military integration was of concern to only five out of six countries. 
Economic Europe,  on the other hand,  could  expand considerably by accepting 
the applications for membership at present under consideration. As to politi-
cal Europe, its  nucleus need not necessarily be confined to the EEC coun-
"·  tries. Europe would also make progress if the European governments tried 
to adopt common positions before taking part in the debates of international 
organizations. During the Atlantic Conference in Paris, Mr. Harmel, had 
dwelt on the concept of European solidarity which had emerged in spite of the 
changes that had occurred throughout the world. It would thus serve  a useful 
purpose to intensify the dialogue between the two Atlantic blocs so often 
alluded to by President Kennedy and then by President Saragat and President 
Hallstein. If such ideas could arouse a favourable response, the signatories 
to the Rome Treaty might take the initiative of making a frank proposal to 
other European countries with a similar regime. In Mr. Harmel's view, 
Europe could not go forward without the participation of great countries on an 
equal footing. There could be no Europe without France. Nor could there be a 
Europe without Germany whose only prospect of counterbalancing nationalistic 
urges lay in appreciable progress in building Europe. Again, there could be no 
Europe without Great Britain. A Europe characterized by aneasingoftensions 
-53 -needed Britain. It was inconceivable that a Europe moving closer, first to 
Germany and now to Eastern Europe,  should be moving away from Britain. 
Moreover an approach to communist Europe should be accompanied by a 
strengthening of the ties between the West European countries with the same 
democratic regime. 
The presence of the country with the oldest parliamentary tradition was a 
political necessity. If adhesion to the Treaty of Rome could help that country's 
economy, then political Europe, however rudimentary its development at the 
start, should not today do without it. A marked awareness now existed of the 
need for the co-ordination of science policies at European level. Belgium had been 
extremely active in this sphere. President Johnson had decided to set up a Commit-
tee to study the problem of Europe's technological lag, and the F anfani proposal 
aimed at European and Atlantic co-operation in this matter.  Finally,  Belgium had 
taken the initiative of  arranging a meeting of EEC Ministers in February with 
a view to making a  searching study of disparities in technological achieve-
ments. Mr. Harmel stressed the need to investigate the technological lag 
which undoubtedly  existed in Europe. The setting up of new structures would 
have to be considered. With this in view, the Belgians had backed the Fanfani 
proposal. But, first of all, the positions and the methods adopted in the EEC 
would have to be brought into line. Great Britain should then be called in to 
shar.e in the work. Only thus could a dialogue between Europe and the United 
States give effective results. 
Another idea on Europe concerned the easing of East-West tensions. After 
consulting the West European and Eastern bloc governments, the Belgian 
government had come to the conclusion that tension could only be eased still 
further if a distinction was made between military and economic d~tente and 
political d~tente, whose main aim was the reunification of Germany and the 
peace treaty with that country. These different tasks, preparations for which 
have reached various stages of advancement and which,  in the initial stage at 
least, have to be carried out in different localities, will later have to be 
brought into line. This could be taken up at a conference on European securi-
ty and economic co-operation of which the Belgian government would be in 
favour provided suitable preparations were made. 
Mr. Dehousse (Socialist) asked whether we 'did not make a mistake in 1961-
62  in rejecting the F ouchet Plan. Although this plan was far removed from my 
ideas of social and European organization,  it was a start and, had it been ac-
cepted,  could have staved off the crisis of 30 June 1965'. 
Mr . Dehousse went on to say that the 'revival of political union should be re-
garded on a more modest scale, provided that the United Kingdom is allowed 
to join in. The possibility of relaunching the idea of political union, provided 
it is preceded by consultation, is not to be ruled out. I am a keen champion of 
British entry to the Common Market. The outlook at the moment is nothow-
ever exactly encouraging. A fresh breakdown in the negotiations, which would 
be strongly resented, must at all events be avoided. I am therefore wondering 
-54-whether the plan for political wtion with Britain's political participation 
should not be pushed ahead with, particularly in preparation for the next stage, 
i.e. membership of the Common Market. I was at one time in favour of ma-
king Britain's entry to the political wtion conditional on its previous member-
ship of the Commwtities. Under present circumstances, I am now inclined to 
envisage the reverse'. 
Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for European Affairs, felt that the question of 
British membership of the Common Market called for a down-to-earth assess-
ment of the situation. The difficulties encowttered were not entirely due to 
this or that member of the Commwtity,  and recognition by Britain of its own 
faults would not come amiss. Britain had far too long adopted a reticent 
attitude towards the European idea. Whatever difficulties lay ahead, 
Mr. Van Elslande emphasized that Belgium had the political will needed to 
surmowtt  each and every one of them so that Britain be admitted to the Euro-
pean Commwtity. 
b)  Italy 
Discussions on the European policy by the Committee for Foreign Affairs of 
the Chamber of Deputies 
On 10 January the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies 
debated various problems concerning Europe. 
Mr. Vedovato (Christian Democrat) asked Mr. Fanfani whether the Govern-
ment intended, in its bid to relawtch Europe, to make any new proposals to 
solve the problem of a European University at Florence. In reply Mr. Fanfani 
gave assurances about the Italian Government's intentions for a definition of 
the problem which would have to be solved through the recognition,  by all the 
cowttries of the Commwtity, of the qualifications awarded by the European 
Univer~ity. 
Mr. La Malfa (Republican) said, with reference to the planned summit con-
ference, that it would be -advisable to bear in mind what the attitude of de Gaulle 
might be, particularly as regards the accession of the United Kingdom to the 
Common Market. If Britain continued to be kept out of the EEC,  an Anglo-
Saxon Community, comprising the United Kingdom and the USA,  might come 
into being  as an alternative to Britain's accession and this would constitute 
a negative factor. Indeed this would consolidate the Franco-German bloc 
which would become a kind of axis with in the European Commwtity. So it was 
desirable for Italy to bring up these disturbing prospects at the conference 
and,  possibly, for her to dissipate them. 
-55 -Mr. Bettiol (Christian Democrat) said it was the duty of the wholehearted 
Europeans to react against the present disintegration of Europe, to counter-
act the wasted effort involved in signing bilateral agreements or in taking 
unilateral initiatives. It was also desirable to make tenacious efforts to per· 
suade the United Kingdom to enter the EEC and to do without mental reser-
vations and without being borne down by mercantile considerations. At the 
same time it was extremely important n~t to accuse the whole of France for 
the recent errors of French European and foreign policy and to bear in mind 
the considerable contribution that the French nation could make to Europe. 
If an attempt were made to build a bridge with London directly, this would 
probably break up the natural political design of Europe. 
Mr. Cantalupo (Liberal) reaffirmed the support of the Liberals for the 
Foreign Minister in his move to create the necessary apparatus to overcome 
the technical gap between Europe and America. He agreed with the Minister 
that the presence of the United Kingdom in Europe would be an extremely 
positive factor in the technological  development of the European countries. 
But it was not only for this reason that his Group trusted that Britain would 
join EEC. There was no doubt that European unity could not come about witb 
out the United Kingdom. 
Mr. Scelba (Christian Democrat) said that the forthcoming summit conferen 
ce could and should not consist solely in a simple celebration of the tenth 
anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. It should also deal with those clauses 
in the Treaties which had not yet been put into effect such as, for example, 
those on the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage. 
Mr. Vecchietti (Proletarian Unity Socialist) stated that in view of the seriou: 
crisis in the Atlantic Alliance, the choice was between an authoritarian 
Gaullist dispensation and one in the Socialist mould. The question of Britain 
accession, which France opposed, because she feared that this would subse· 
quently open Europe to American influence,  could be expressed in these term 
The American influence furthermore would increase because of the technolo 
gical gap and it was illusory to think that this could be bridged with financial 
assistance from the Unites States. 
Mr. de Marsanich (Socialist Movement) said he agreed to the forthcoming 
summit conference and pointed out that this could not omit to discuss the 
problem of Britain's accession to the EEC and it was therefore desirable to 
note  that this accession should take place, England's being required to give 
specific guarantees with reference to the political union of the States of 
Europe. He said that the responsibility for Britain's failure to join EEC cou) 
not be attributed wholly to France, bearing in mind the pro-european tradit: 
ons of which France was the custodian as opposed to the anti-european tradi 
tion that had been a feature of British foreign policy. 
Mr. Cattani (Socialist) said with reference to Britain's bid for entry into thE 
Community that his political party wished to underline the need to stand up t 
-56 -<'ranee in discussions on this question and to do so by working out a common 
>osition for France's five Community partners. Mr. Cattani made clear that 
he Socialists were in favour of Britain's joining EEC and especially for 
·easons connected with the democratic contribution that the United Kingdom 
~ould make towards the building of Europe and which could not be dissociated 
:rom Britain's economic,  scientific and technological contribution . 
.  \tlr.  Pacciardi (Allied Members Group) recalled that to be consistent with the 
tims of the Treaties of Rome,  it had to be remembered that they were ' 
~esigned to bring into existence the kind of structures needed for a federal 
~ntity. It could therefore be asked,  he went on,  if  ,from this viewpoi.nt,  the 
Jossible and hoped-for accession of the United Kingdom to the Community 
:!ould be regarded as a  positive or negative factor ; it was likely he said, that 
Britain's accession would consolidate the emphasis that General de Gaulle 
.vished to give to Europe as a purely mercantile Community. It had been with 
:lis appointment,  therefore, that he had noted the disagreements  among  the 
)arties of the majority about the policy that Italy should pursue at the Euro-
)ean level, for these disagreements were prejudicial to the vital interests of 
~he State. 
Nith reference to Britain's accession, Mr. Edoardo Martino {Christian Demo-
crat) stressed the extreme importance of the Labour  cabinet reshuffle ; as a 
result the most committed Europeans in the Labour Party had been brought 
into the Government. With regard to France, Mr.  Edoardo Martino said the 
statements rriade in this connexion by the Foreign Minister could not be taken 
to indicate a politically negative attitude. The first negotiations, he said, had 
failed because the Nassau  Agreements were signed in the interim between 
Britain and the United States. 
Mr. Bemporad,  (Socialist) stressed that the problem of bridging the techno-
logical gap between Europe and the United States brought up, with even greater 
force,  the whole issue of political integration. In this context it was worth re-
peating the need to give greater powers to the European Parliament. The 
policies of France and the United Kingdom, he said, were also the result of 
pressure from public opinion. Everything in the present situation had to be 
turned to account to promote European integration. 
Mr. Sterchi (Christian Democrat) dwelt particularly on the European Commu-
nity's social problems. He said that it would be desirable to examine· these 
problems at the forthcoming summit conference. This should include a review 
of the problems of the European Social Fund, occupational training,  a review 
and an up-dating of the social security regulations and,  above all, the prepa-
ration of a final settlement on the free movement of workers, due to come into 
force on 1 July 1968. 
Mr. Paglietta (Communist) said that the main problem in Europe was one of 
breaking down the existing blocs. In this context the choice between France 
and the United Kingdom was quite irrelevant. The key issue lay tn Europe's 
-57 -independence from the United States of America. (Camera dei Deputati, 
Bollettino delle Giunte delle Commissioni Parlamentari, Affari  Esteri, 
10 January 1967) 
c)  Luxembourg 
Luxembourg's European policy 
In a Government statement made in the Chamber of Deputies of 10 January, 
Mr. P. Werner, President of the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
bourg, discussed the European policy that his Government would pursue, 
respecting Community principles. The policy of acting as host to the Euro-
pean institutions would be continued both within the present framework and 
within that of agreements reached between the Six Governments on the occa-
sion of the treaty on the merger of the executives. With reference to the im-
plementation of the Treaty of Paris relating to the ECSC furthermore, the 
Government would endeavour,  in conjunction with its partners, to find 
solutions to the present problems that were consistent with the principles of 
a unified market without discrimination and those of Community solidarity 
embodied in the treaty. 
The forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of the 
United Kingdom would give the Government the opportunity to become better 
informed concerning the ideas of the British Government and to inform them 
of Luxembourg's fundamentally constructive attitude. The Government had 
also approved the initiative taken by the Italian Government to organize a 
commemorative session at a very high political level for the tenth anniversary 
of the signing of the Treaty of Rome. (Official Documents) 
d)  Netherlands 
1.  Representation of Surinam and of the Netherlands Antilles under their 
association with the EEC 
During the debate on the 1967 budget of the Cabinet of the Deputy Prime Minis-
ter on 5 and 11 January, the spokesmen of the different groups of the Second 
Chamber pointed out that the system of association linking these territo~ies 
with the Kingdom of the Netherlands did not provide them proper representa-
-58 -tion within the Community institutions and made no provision for contacts 
with the European Parliament. The groups therefore insisted on representa-
tion of the parliamentary institution (the 'States') of Surinam and the Nether-
lands Antilles within the Parliamentary Conference of the Yaound~ Associa-
tion since these countries satisfied the conditions laid down in Article 2 of the 
Conference's rules of procedure. 
In his reply Mr. Biesheuvel, Deputy Prime Minister, drew attention to the 
marked difference between the attitude of the Association of Surinam and the 
Netherlands Antilles on the one hand and that of the African and Malagasy 
States on the other. Moreover Article 2 of the Y  aound~ Association 
Conference 's rules of procedure permitted only observers, without the right to 
speak or to vote. Mr. B iesheuvel doubted whether the 'States' of Surinam and of the 
Netherlands Antilles wanted the status of observer. He felt it was up to the 
States General and the States of Surinam and of the Netherlands Antilles to 
take steps to remedy this state of affairs in some way at parliamentary level. 
If need be,  Mr. Biesheuvel was ready to share in such initiatives. 
In addition,  the Statute of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in no way barred the 
ministers plenipotentiary of these two countries from taking part as full mem-
bers in the work of the EEC Council when. questions of particular interest to 
one of them came up for discussion. The Government would see to it that the 
Kingdom's interests were defended by the minister plenipotentiary who was 
most directly concerned.  · 
On the other hand,  admission of officials of Surinam and the Antilles to the 
Consultative Committee of the Development Fund, though fully compatible 
with the Statute of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, would mean that projects 
would be examined by the very persons who had submitted them -an absurd 
situation. (Second Chamber, Debates ,sessions of 5 and 11 January 1967) 
2.  Harmonization of turnover tax 
On 10, 11  and 12 January the Second Chamber held a lengthy debate on the 
harmonization of turnover tax in the EEC. This arose from the EEC Council 
of Ministers' resolution of 11 May 1966 in which the Council decided to make 
a ruling by 31January 1967, on the first two proposals for directives concer-
ning harmonization of member States' legislative provisions on turnover tax. 
This decision would be a first step towards the elimination of tax frontiers 
between member States. Neither the harmonization of turnover tax nor the 
abolition of tax barriers in the Community received the plaudits ofthe speakers. 
Turnover tax was such an important feature of the national taxation system 
that the entire fiscal and budgetary policy,  on which the domestic social and 
wage policy closely depended, was bound up with it. The abolition of tax bar-
-59 -riers was fraught with consequences for the political independence of member 
States. These consequences could only be accepted if the parliamentary and 
democratic supervision to be surrendered by the States were taken over by a 
European Parliament operating on normal lines and carrying as much weight 
as the States themselves. 
Moreover, harmonizing turnover tax meant harmonizing direct taxes and 
excise duties. The thorny problem of state monopolies also entered into this 
question. The Netherlands were in a very special position because of a tax 
system that differed appreciably from that of the other EEC countries, par-
ticulary as far as the distribution of the tax burden was concerned. Domestic 
policy should therefore be allowed sufficient room. According to a number of 
speakers the abolition of  tax frontiers was not laid down by the Treaty. On 
the other hand,  the Netherlands should not let themselves be shut out in the 
negotiations on the entire problem of tax harmonization in the event of its 
partners' deciding to go over to it. 
In his reply,  Mr. Zijlstra, Prime Minister,  Minister for General Affairs and 
Minister of Finance, said that whether this or that point was or was not an 
obligation laid down by the Treaty was only of relative interest. Since the 
previous Government had approved the Council resolution of 11  May 1966, he 
felt one had to accept the obligation - at least the moral obligation - to take 
part in a decision on the two proposals for directives. Now that the partners 
were introducing the value-added tax, the 'cascade' tax system in force in the 
Netherlands presented increasingly difficult problems to the entire import and 
export industries. It would be a good thing therefore to see whether it might 
be possible, over a transitional period, to introduce a measure of flexibility 
into the present standstill on levies and refunds. 
As to whether the Chamber could surrender its budgetary powers, that is, its 
right to decide in the last resort on the level and the manner of distributing 
the fiscal burden, Mr. Zijlstra replied 'Broadly speaking, no ; but sometimes 
necessity knows no law.' 
In the EEC Council the approach Mr. Zijlstra intended to adopt was to accept 
the value-added tax system,  leave in abeyance all questions relating to rates 
and  decline  to accept any time-limit for their standardization. As regards 
the second proposal for a directive,  and more particularly the articles rela-
ting to rates, hewouldtrytogaintime. BecauseoftheNetherlands' special fis-
cal structure within the Six,  it might require a longer transitional period than 
the other countries. Even if it was felt that the final system of value-added 
tax would not in the long run leave much room for action on exemptions and 
rate differentiation, it was still necessary to have enough time to incorporate 
it smoothly in the domestic system. 
As regards parliamentary powers, new ways would have to be sought to 
ensure the progress of the EEC with a view to the national parliaments or the 
European Parliament playing a part. 
- 60  -At the close of f.1e  debate on 12 January, the Chamber adopted the following 
two motions : 
The Chamber ; 
Having hear<'. the different views expressed on the harmonization of the turn-
over tax in tne EEC ; 
Having regard to the resolutions of the EEC Council of Ministers of 
11  May 1966; 
Considers that the decisions relating to the first and to the second directive 
should at least leave Dutch legislators sufficient scope to enable them to 
decide,  in complete independence,  on tax rates and exemptions ; 
Invites the Government to take steps accordingly, 
And passes on to the business of the day. 
The Chamber ; 
Having heard the debates on the harmonization of turnover tax in the EEC ; 
Recognizing the need to amend the tax systems of member States so as to 
remove the distorting effects they have on competition in the Community ; 
Believing the value-added tax system to be acceptable : 
Believing that the determination of the level and of the manner of distributing 
the tax burden should obviously remain under parliamentary supervision ; 
Believing that the European Parliament's powers in this respect are still 
highly inadequate ; 
Is of the opinion that the Netherlands Government should not,  in the Council 
of Ministers, take any final decision on common  rules concerning the level 
and the manner of distributing the tax burden before consulting the Dutch 
Government ;  · 
And passes on to the business of the day. 
(Debates of the Second Chamber, sessions  of 10, 11 and 12 January 1967) 
3.  Community system of subsidies for coking coal 
On 3 January 1967 Mr. Bakker,  Minister for Economic Affairs,  stated in 
reply to a number of questions tabled on 14 December 1966 by Mr. Oele of the 
Dutch Labour Party, that at a meeting held on 22 November the Special 
Council of Ministers of the ECSC had referred the question of the Community 
system of subsidies for its coking coal,  and the question - of particular con-
cern to the Netherlands - of the situation regarding the Community's domestic. 
- 61  -coal, for further study, to the ad hoc committee on coal which would report 
on the subject  at the next meeting of  the  Special Council of  Ministers. 
(Source : Annex  to  the  report on the  proceedings  of the  Second Chamber, 
session 1966-67, 33 9) 
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